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ABSTRACT 
PIONEERS, PROCLAMATIONS, AND PATENTS: 
A NARRATIVE OF THE CONQUEST, DIVISION, SETTLEMENT, AND TRANSFORMATION OF  
KENTUCKY 
Brandon M. Robison 
May 1, 2013 
This study provides a narrative of Revolutionary Kentucky, focused on three key areas. First, 
it traces the struggle Native Americans, white settlers and speculators, and the various 
colonial, state, imperial, and national governments that claimed the territory for control and 
possession of Kentucky’s lands in the late eighteenth century. Second, this study focuses on the 
long-term effects of the struggle over Kentucky’s lands, paying particular attention to Virginia’s 
land laws of 1778-79, which created the framework by which the state distributed Kentucky’s 
land, and based on poor implementation of Jeffersonian notions of republicanism and allodial 
land ownership. Third, this study examines. The region's transition from an Indian hunting 
ground to an agricultural economy radically changed the ecology; seeing the elimination of 
Kentucky’s bison as an archetype of the broader environmental changes taking place. This 
study argues, in short, that the conflict over the use and ownership of Kentucky lands 
dramatically impacted Native Americans, Euro-Americans, the future course of western 
settlement, and the ecology of the region itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
John Filson’s famous pamphlet, The Discovery, Settlement, and Present State of 
Kentucke (1784), contains a fascinating description of a region in transition. Today, historians 
often view Filson’s work as an example of clever advertising, rather than a thoughtful study. 
However, the book possesses important clues about the environmental, political, and social 
factors driving settlement patterns within the boundaries of Kentucky. Though Filson painted a 
rosy picture for potential Kentucky residents, his description omitted important details. 
Kentucky and the Ohio Valley region were still fraught with violence and Indian wars. Kentucky’s 
environment was in dramatic transition, and by 1784, much of the vaunted Bluegrass region was 
already claimed and its environment in dramatic transition. Land, the commodity Filson tried to 
sell in his work, was not easy to obtain. Law suits already divided Kentucky’s land claimants into 
decades-long legal wars. Filson described Kentucky, “As yet united to the State of Virginia, they 
are governed by her wholesome laws, which are virtuously executed, and with excellent 
decorum.”1 However, Virginia’s laws and policies generated many of the problems facing 
settlers of the state’s western territories. The situation threatened Virginia’s cultural and 
political hegemony over Kentucky and eventually sparked Kentucky’s separation from Virginia 
and creation as the fifteenth state in the union.  
Historians have long described Kentucky’s transition from a Native American hunting 
ground to the first western state. Individual studies have focused on specific subgroups like 
politicians, Native Americans, squatters, long hunters, planters, and speculators. However, 
                                                          
1
 John Filson, The Discovery and Settlement of Kentucke (Ann Arbor [Mich.]: University Microfilms, 1966), 
23. 
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historians struggle to integrate these stories into a single narrative. They also fail to articulate 
the broader impact of Euro-American colonization in Kentucky. In particular, historians have 
neglected the significance and glanced over the important consequences of Virginia’s land laws 
of 1778-79, which arose from a complex web of social, military, economic, and environmental 
factors. The process that Virginia established to distribute Kentucky’s lands left a chaotic record. 
Settlers confronted by the challenges accompanied with land ownership in Kentucky frequently 
moved to other lands further west. Historians have largely done the same, giving the land laws 
too little attention. 
Purpose 
This study has three primary goals. First, it seeks to trace the struggle over 
the control and possession of Kentucky’s lands in the late eighteenth century. This narrative 
involves a large number of historical actors, but it focuses on the intersection of Native 
Americans, white settlers and speculators, and the various colonial, state, imperial, 
and national governments that claimed the territory. The decisions and actions of each party 
influenced the others in important ways as all sought to control Kentucky’s lands to further 
their varied interests. 
Second, this study focuses on the long-term effects of the struggle over Kentucky’s 
lands. It pays particular attention to Virginia’s land laws of 1778-79, which created the 
framework by which the state distributed Kentucky’s land. The laws had important social, 
political, and economic consequences for each of the parties involved. This thesis highlights the 
role that Jeffersonian notions of republicanism and allodial land ownership played in the 
formation and legacy of the land laws. 
Third, this study examines the transformation of Kentucky itself. The region's transition 
from an Indian hunting ground to an agricultural economy radically changed the ecology. While 
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Ohio Indians husbanded Kentucky’s herds of bison, elk, and deer, Kentucky’s white population 
hunted each to the point of local extinction. Seeing the elimination of Kentucky’s bison as an 
archetype of the broader environmental changes taking place, this thesis considers the 
fundamental changes in Kentucky’s ecology that resulted from the political, social, and 
economic transformations of the era. 
This study argues, in short, that the conflict over the use and ownership of Kentucky 
lands dramatically impacted Native Americans, Euro-Americans, the future course of western 
settlement, and the ecology of the region itself. 
Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following key questions. First, what made Kentucky’s 
lands such prized commodities, and what were the results of the competition between the 
various parties in Kentucky? The governments of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina all 
worked to claim their portion of the region. Likewise, land speculators, Native Americans, 
squatters, politicians, and even founding fathers battled aggressively over Kentucky. Each group 
had different visions for the region and they seldom coincided. The claimants to Kentucky 
settled their disputes in court, in the state house, and on the battlefield. The first chapter 
describes Kentucky’s topography and ecology, and the region’s history prior to the American 
Revolution. This broad topic raises several smaller questions: How did colonial America’s view 
Kentucky? What was Kentucky’s natural environment like? How did Virginia substantiate its 
hegemony over the region? What role did Native Americans play in Kentucky? The answers to 
these and many other questions highlight the significance of Kentucky during the pre-
Revolutionary era.  
The second question in this study is more specific: Namely, what role did the colony and 
state of Virginia play in the process of settling, partitioning, and defending Kentucky? To answer 
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this question requires studying Virginia’s official land policies, traditions, politics, and broader 
issues of the Revolutionary era such as taxation, war funding, recruitment, and national military 
strategy. Virginia’s 1778-79 land laws, passed during Thomas Jefferson’s tenure as the state’s 
governor, are the focus of the second chapter. These laws represented a blueprint for the 
region’s settlement. Read with care they offer a window into the complex social and political 
trends of the era.  
The third chapter of this study confronts the question of legacy: Namely, what were the 
long term effects of Virginia’s policies and laws on the new United States, Native Americans, and 
Kentucky and its environment? Virginia’s experience in Kentucky shaped the history of the two 
states and the national narrative as well. This study argues, for example, that Thomas Jefferson 
designed the land allotments of Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to avoid the problems associated 
with the distribution of land in Kentucky. Likewise, various states designed their land 
distribution systems to avoid Virginia’s problems with its Revolutionary War veteran bounty 
program.  
Literature and Historiography 
This study covers a broad range of literature including works on the Ohio Indians, 
Virginia planters, long-hunters, colonial and state politics, and Revolutionary and Indian warfare. 
However, several works deeply inform this thesis and support its argument. Thomas Perkins 
Abernathy’s Western Lands and the American Revolution (1959) remains an exceptionally 
detailed work about the war on the frontier and the role of the frontier in colonial politics.2 
George Morgan Chinn’s Kentucky: Settlement and Statehood (1975) provides the most complete 
                                                          
2
 Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Western Lands and the American Revolution (New York: Russell & Russell, 
1959). 
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narrative history of eighteenth century Kentucky.3 Even portions of Theodore Roosevelt’s The 
Winning of the West (1904) provide useful insight into the era.4 Though his thesis remains much 
derided, his sources are of good quality.  
Native Americans also feature prominently in this study. Richard White’s The Middle 
Ground Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (1991) discusses 
the Indians of the Ohio Valley and the pays de’n haut – French for Upper Country.5 White’s book 
provides both a helpful description of the Native Americans living north of the Ohio, as well as a 
detailed narrative of their relations with white settlers in Kentucky and elsewhere in the trans-
Appalachian West.  
Several recent studies of early Kentucky offer excellent accounts of the period in 
question. Craig Thompson Friend’s Kentucke’s Frontiers (2010) provides an updated albeit 
abridged version of Chinn’s work.6 Leslie Scott Philyaw’s Virginia’s Western Visions: Political and 
Cultural Expansion on the American Frontier (2004) explores the role of Virginia’s political elites, 
particularly Thomas Jefferson, in shaping the cultural and political relationship between the 
original state and its new western counterparts.7 John Mack Faragher’s Daniel Boone: The Life 
and Legend of an American Pioneer (1992) draws deeply on the primary sources from Boone’s 
period, including the complex and largely untapped Draper Manuscripts.8 This work provides the 
best summary of Boone’s role in Kentucky history. Finally, Peter Onuf’s Statehood and Union: A 
History of the Northwest Ordinance (1987) provides the best discussion of the Northwest 
                                                          
3
 George Morgan Chinn, Hambleton Tapp, and Libby Fraas, Kentucky Settlement and Statehood:, 1750-
1800 (Frankfort: The Kentucky Historical Society, 1975). 
4
 Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West (New York: Putnam's, 1889). 
5
 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
6
 Craig Thompson Friend, Kentucke's Frontiers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
7
 Leslie Scott Philyaw, Virginia's Western Visions: Political and Cultural Expansion on an Early American 
Frontier (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2004). 
8
 John Mack Faragher, Daniel Boone: The Life and Legend of an American Pioneer (New York: Holt, 1992). 
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Ordinances.9 Two additional books are closely related to the subject of land speculation. Daniel 
M. Friedenberg’s Life, liberty, and the Pursuit of Land: The Plunder of Early America (1992) is 
perhaps the best extant study on land speculation in the trans-Appalachian West during the 
colonial, Revolutionary, and early national periods.10 The book focuses on the founding fathers 
and the role land speculation played in national and state politics. Kentucky features 
prominently in this study. Stephen Aron’s How the West Was Lost (1999) focuses more narrowly 
on Kentucky, and explores the region’s evolution from Indian hunting ground to Henry Clay’s 
political “Bluegrass System.”11 Aron’s discussion of land distribution in Kentucky offers the 
starting point and inspiration for this study.  
Primary Sources 
In addition to the newspapers, Indian treaties, official correspondence, government 
legislation, and other common sources used in studies of this type, this thesis draws on primary 
sources the existing literature largely overlooks. First and most important, this study looks at 
land grants and patents by the state of Virginia. The land grants help document the chaotic 
process of settlement within Kentucky. Virginia reserved a significant portion of Kentucky’s 
lands, those south of the Green River, for Revolutionary War veterans. This program had the 
greatest potential for success among all of Jefferson’s land laws, but it became an abject failure. 
Though many if not most of the patents offered to Revolutionary veterans ended up in other 
men’s hands, the original patents are recorded in Joan Brookes-Smith’s Master Index, Virginia 
Surveys and Grants, 1774-1791 (1976) and the Kentucky Historical Society’s Index for Old 
                                                          
9
 Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1987). 
10
 Daniel M. Friedenberg, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Land: The Plunder of Early America (Buffalo, N.Y.: 
Prometheus Books, 1992). 
11
 Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry 
Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
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Kentucky Surveys & Grants (1975).12 The index contains thousands of land patents and surveys, 
the names of patentees, the general location and size of their claims, and the type of patent.13 
Revolutionary War veteran land patents from all thirteen states are documented in Lloyd DeWitt 
Bockstruck’s Revolutionary War Bounty Land Grants Awarded By State Governments (1996), 
while William Lindsay Hopkins provides a list of veterans who appealed denials of patents in 
Virginian Revolutionary War Land Grant Claims, 1783-1850 (rejected) (1988).14 Another 
relatively untapped source are the Draper Manuscripts. Collector Lyman Draper amassed these 
letters, diaries, and interviews during the early 1800s. Traveling around the trans-Appalachian 
West, Draper sought to document the memories of the last remaining members of the pioneer 
generation, including Daniel Boone’s youngest surviving son, Nathan Boone. Draper also 
collected large numbers of family and personal documents and letters. He compiled nearly five 
hundred volumes of historical documents and interviews, which are currently stored at the 
University of Wisconsin Madison, with various Microfilm collections available elsewhere.  
Challenges 
The subject of land distribution in Kentucky remains a side note in most histories of the 
state’s early years. Land distribution, patenting, and military bounties receive only a chapter, or 
a few paragraphs in most Kentucky histories, almost certainly because of the chaotic nature of 
the extant records. Many patentees never came to Kentucky, but promptly sold their patents to 
speculators or anyone else who would purchase them. Many names on the books are false, with 
imposters amassing huge estates through dozens of fictional aliases. The complete records 
                                                          
12
 Joan Brookes-Smith, Master Index, Virginia Surveys and Grants, 1774-1791)(Frankfort: Kentucky 
Historical Society, 1976); Kentucky Historical Society, Index for Old Kentucky Surveys & Grants, 
Microfilmed by Kentucky Historical Society (Frankfort, Ky: The Society, 1975). 
13
 Both databases are available online through the Kentucky Historical Society, and are fully searchable. 
14
Lloyd DeWitt Bockstruck, Revolutionary War Bounty Land Grants: Awarded by State Governments 
(Baltimore, MD: Genealogical Pub. Co, 1996); William Lindsay Hopkins, Virginian Revolutionary War Land 
Grant Claims 1783-1850 (rejected), (Self Published,1988). 
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include only the names of the original patentees, and not those who received the land second 
hand. Still, the records indicate general patterns of land concentration in the hands of a few 
individuals. 
Though scholars have described Kentucky’s origins in some detail, they have 
intentionally glazed over the land issue because of the complex work needed to unravel the 
process. However, several examples of veterans selling their claims, false names, and foul play 
illustrate the effects of Virginia’s land laws. 
Significance 
A detailed study of Virginia’s land policy in Kentucky does not exist. The challenges 
presented by the source material has steered scholars away from the difficult and tedious 
research. Moreover, in the modern American memory, early Kentucky remains the land of 
Boone and Simon Kenton. In comparison to the compelling narratives offered by such historical 
figures, studies of land policy may appear less interesting. 
However, the study of land policy, distribution, and settlement is an exceptionally 
important part of early national U.S. history. Indeed, Kentucky was the first trans-Appalachian 
region to experience such rapid subdivision and distribution. Likewise, it was the first such 
settlement carried out under the influence of the Revolutionary ideology. Finally, Indians, 
squatters, land speculators, long hunters, politicians, and governments all played a part in the 
process. This makes Kentucky’s settlement a useful case study of the intersection of a large 
number of interested parties in Revolutionary America. Kentucky represented many different 
things to the people who competed over its lands. The region’s land offered a source of food, 
raw materials, funding for Virginia’s war effort, soldier compensation, individual wealth, social 
advancement, and independence. More important, Kentucky’s lands set precedents for many 
aspects of future western expansion. The lessons learned in Kentucky shaped other states’ land 
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policies, and the national strategy for carving up the lands of the Old Northwest. Virginia’s vision 
for Kentucky soon failed in a chaotic legal, military, and social mess sparked by the 1778-79 land 
laws, which also led to Kentucky’s independence. Likewise, Kentucky revealed the abrupt 
ecological transformation of the trans-Appalachian West caused by white settlement. 
Ultimately, Filson’s idealization of Kentucky proves insufficient to understand the intense 
conflict for the region. 
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CHAPTER 1: “KENTUCKEE” 
 
“A Beautiful Prospect:” “Kentuckee” as Geographical and Ecological Construct 
 
 The modern state of Kentucky is comprised of lands south of the Ohio River, west of the 
Big Sandy River, and east of the Mississippi, with most of the state falling above the 36o 30” 
north parallel. Though the state’s physical extent has remained fairly constant and clearly 
defined over two centuries, in the colonial era “Kentucky” denoted the lands west of the 
Appalachians, south of the Ohio, and north of Cherokee territory. Understanding the role that 
Kentucky played in early American history requires comprehending what the word “Kentucky” 
meant to seventeenth-century Native and Euro Americans. Kentucky represented more than a 
set of geographic delineations for each demographic. The names “Kentucky,” “Kentuckee,” or 
“Caintukee” all referred to the same region. However, they represented many different things 
to the various people and groups that vied for hegemony in the region. No scholar has 
determined the origin of the name “Kentucky,” though some believe that it is an Anglicized 
derivative of an Iroquoian word meaning lands south of the Ohio River. John Filson, Kentucky’s 
first historian, claimed that Indians referred to Kentucky “by the name of the Dark and Bloody 
Ground, and sometimes the Middle Ground.”15 The origins of the name may never be 
definitively ascertained, but Native and white Americans’ perceptions of “Kentucky” were 
deeply rooted in the natural world. 
Geography and ecology played primary roles in defining Kentucky. The region’s 
geographic features not only gave shape to its future borders, but also laid the foundations for 
                                                          
15
 Filson, Discovery and Settlement of Kentucky, 7. 
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its ecological regions. Portions of “Kentucky” differed significantly and thus offered their human 
tenants varying opportunities. As historians David Hackett Fisher and James C. Kelly surmise, 
“Biological conditions fixed the limits of life itself and shaped the process of settlement.”16 
Different users, moreover, saw varied opportunities in each of Kentucky’s ecosystems and 
topographical zones. Those uses brought various factions into conflict over the region’s 
resources. Indeed, Kentucky possessed unique geographic, geopolitical, and ecological features 
that earmarked the region as the primary bridgehead of European expansion across the 
Appalachians.  
The Bluegrass region, which now surrounds Lexington, Kentucky, for fifty miles in any 
direction, lay at Kentucky’s ecological, geographic, and economic heart. Owning a piece of the 
Bluegrass’s rolling hills, verdant soils, and savanna ecosystem offered farmers in an agriculture-
based economy the modern equivalent of striking oil. Describing Kentucky’s productivity, John 
Filson gushed, “This country is richest on the higher lands, exceeding the finest low grounds in 
the settled parts of the continent.” Potential settlers could expect unprecedented yields: “above 
one hundred bushels of good corn were produced from an acre in one season.” Filson even 
claimed that on occasion the land was “too rich for wheat till it has been reduced by four or five 
years cultivation.”17 Filson’s observations represented more hyperbole and salesmanship than 
fact, but the Bluegrass’s reputation for remarkable agricultural production drew thousands of 
white settlers in the late eighteenth century. Such productive potency is derived from the 
Bluegrass region’s rich water-retaining loam soils, which rest on a bed of Ordovician limestone. 
This lime, rich in phosphorus, provides a natural fertilizer to the soils of the region.18 
                                                          
16
 David Hackett Fischer and James C. Kelly, Bound Away: Virginia and the Westward Movement 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 78. 
17
 Filson, Discovery and Settlement of Kentucky, 19.  
18
 See “Geology of Kentucky: Bluegrass Region,” Kentucky Geological Survey: University of Kentucky, 
http://www.uky.edu/KGS/geoky/regionbluegrass.htm (accessed April 2, 2013). 
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Other portions of the state offered varying degrees of productivity. The region south of 
the Green River, once known as the “Green River Barrens,” eventually became a second 
Bluegrass, though Filson saw it as little more tha grazing and foraging land.19 Euro-Americans 
reared in the forested eastern seaboard saw grassland as an indication of low productivity. 
Common knowledge dictated that the best lands produced trees of great size and diversity.20 
Likewise, the dense root networks of prairie grasses offered a greater challenge to the 
rudimentary plowing and tilling devices of eighteenth century settlers than did trees, which 
could be girdled and cleared with relative ease. Among these various grasslands and meadows 
stood mountains and hills divided by covered streams in largely deciduous forest of great 
diversity. Cane breaks also peppered the landscape, adding another layer of diversity to an 
already prolific ecosystem. 
Kentucky’s diversity and abundance in flora certainly interested farmers seeking new 
opportunities. However, the region’s fauna offered explorers and hunters the most memorable 
material. Kentucky abounded with a quantity and diversity of game of that simply did not exist 
elsewhere in the colonies. Early settlers expressed the most interest in the larger quadrupeds. 
Elk, deer, black bear, and bison grazed in the meadows, prairies, and cane breaks in numbers 
that colonists had never seen. Thomas Walker’s expedition through Kentucky in 1750 relied 
almost exclusively on bush meat. Walker described his hunting successes in the journal he kept 
along the way: “We killed in the Journey 13 Buffaloes, 8 Elks, 53 Bears, 20 Deer, 4 Wild Geese, 
about 150 Turkeys, besides small Game. We might have killed three times as much meat if we 
had wanted it.”21 Walker’s path narrowly missed the Bluegrass, and only briefly entered the 
                                                          
19
 Filson, Discovery and Settlement of Kentucky, 16. 
20
 Samuel N. Dicken, “The Kentucky Barrens,” Bulletin of the Geographical Society of Philidelphia 33 (Apr. 
1935): 42-51. 
21
 J. Stoddard Johnston, First Explorations of Kentucky: Journals of Dr. Thomas Walker, 1750, and 
Christopher Gist, 1751 (Louisville: John P. Morton and Company, 1898), 79. 
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“Barrens.” Kentucky’s numerous natural salt licks concentrated bison, elk, and deer in numbers 
only surpassed in prairies further west. John Findley, an early explorer and Indian trader who 
followed Walker’s expedition, remembered, “Of bears and buffaloes, elk and deer, their number 
was legion; and at many of the salt-licks of the country, they congregated in such prodigious 
herds, that the sight was truly grand and amazing.”22 Another frontiersman remarked that a 
greater abundance of wildlife “is not to be seen in any part of the known World.”23 
Such prodigious numbers of wild beasts drew Kentucky’s most famous explorers, 
including Daniel Boone. Kentucky offered a biological bounty that further promoted the region’s 
reputation as a promised land. Though Kentucky’s geographical features certainly helped 
delineate its boundaries, the area’s natural resources created a region that John Filson called “a 
beautiful prospect.”24 
A Hunting Preserve: Kentucky’s Environment under Indian Stewardship 
Kentucky’s productivity was due, in part, to natural factors. However, Kentucky’s 
landscape consisted of more than eastern woodland ecosystem, but included a diverse mix of 
ecosystems that supported unprecedented numbers of large animals. Native Americans 
intensively managed the eastern woodland ecosystem to encourage a maximum number of 
game animals. Buffalo, elk, deer, bear, and many other game species thrived in this ecosystem. 
This hunter’s paradise benefitted the local Indians immensely. The large numbers of buffalo 
provided the natives around Kentucky with their winter food source. The Shawnee, Chickasaw, 
                                                          
22
 Nathan Boone cited in Belue, The Long Hunt, 76. .  
23
 John Ormsby to William Barnsley, September 15, 1768 [Historical Magazine, 8:259] Fort Chartres, 15th 
Sept., 1768. Found in Clarence Alvord and Clarence Carter, Trade and Politics, 1767-1769 (Springfield, 
1921), 409. 
24
 Filson, Discovery and Settlement of Kentucky, 13. 
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Cherokee, Yuchi, and several lesser tribes all hunted in Kentucky.25 The buffalo that they killed 
provided them with food, eating utensils, saddles, rugs, mats, and clothing made of both buffalo 
leather and wool. Indians fabricated hoes from the bison’s massive shoulder blades. Bags, 
shields, and various other implements were usually of buffalo hide.26 Though not as dependent 
on the species as the Plains Indians became during the same period, Ohio Valley and 
southeastern Indians relied heavily on the species. Deer were the primary source of food and 
implements for most eastern Native Americans, but buffalo often and increasingly came a close 
second. 
Native Americans’ lives revolved around seasons. During the summer, Indians stayed in 
their semi-permanent villages to practice horticulture, fish, and engage in limited hunting. 
Hunting and gathering still supplemented horticulture, but Indian diets were not guaranteed. 
Even during good years, they faced challenges during the winter and spring months. Food 
supplies usually dwindled during the late winter months through early summer. Indians knew 
the late winter as “the starving time.” As historian Richard White puts it, “winter became a time 
of particular horror.”27 Hunting was usually their only source of winter victuals, despite some 
surpluses from horticultural activity. Though not the rule throughout the southeast, most Indian 
villages simply uprooted during the winter, and headed toward their traditional hunting grounds 
to wait out the worst of the lean months. The trees defoliated made tracking easy; winter was 
the most practical time for hunting. Stephen Aron describes Shawnee hunting patterns as 
follows, “Winter hunts extended over weeks and months and involved travel over long 
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distances…. Hunting trips were not exclusively male sojourns…. Whole families participated on 
longer hunting journeys…. During the peak of the hunting season, Ohio villages were virtually 
deserted. With the coming of spring, hunters and their families returned.”28 Hunting patterns 
ensured a certain level of sustainability. The harshness of Indian life and epic scale of Indian 
deaths from white diseases ensured that, by the mid-eighteenth century, the much-reduced 
Indian population required a minimal number of wild game for their subsistence. 
Indians’ use of fire had dramatically reshaped the landscape. Fire was the most 
important tool at Natives’ disposal, and accomplished several goals. First, Native Americans 
used slash and burn techniques to clear land for horticultural use.29 However, Natives also 
practiced “fire-culture,” which involved burning vast areas of woodland, transforming deciduous 
forest into a lush savanna landscape.30 The effects of these practices were dramatic. White 
settlers encountering these lands assumed the lack of tree cover indicated soil infertility, and 
nicknamed these Indian-made prairies “barrens.”31 Though white settlers thought of the 
Kentucky “barrens” as poor crop land, they did not doubt its value as a hunting ground. 
Native Americans also utilized fire as a means to hunt. Many Indians used “fire-rings” to 
concentrate and trap game.32 Traider Thomas Nairne observed Creek fire rings “of 4 or 5 miles in 
circumference.”33 Fires of this size, designed to burn inward, could just as easily burn outward. 
Countless anonymous fires cleared forests across the Bluegrass in the centuries before white 
encroachment. Native peoples also used fire to improve their future hunting prospects and 
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manage the habitat. Indians all over North America put whole regions periodically to the torch. 
Fire cleared out underbrush, improved animal forage, and improved hunting success by 
reducing cover. Native Americans burned portions of Kentucky to great effect. The Bluegrass 
region’s expansive meadows and the prairie habitats of Kentucky’s Barrens testified to the 
paradoxically destructive and fecund effects of fire.34 Large quadrupeds thrived in this 
environment with its vast amount of available forage.  
The burning of Kentucky’s lands produced one the Indians’ few sources of wealth. Other 
than labor, Native Americans had access to only two commodities valuable to Europeans: land 
and peltry. The fur trade became extremely important both to the Indians and the colonists. 
French, English, and Spanish traders exchanged European goods for beaver, deer, fox, otter, 
bear, mink, raccoon, wolf, and bison hides. By the early eighteenth century, the fur trade played 
an important role in many colonial economies. French Canada’s economy depended on the fur 
trade and peltry, and for a time it was Carolina’s largest export.35 Between 1699 and 1714, the 
colonies of Virginia and Carolina exported a total of 1,087,878 deer skins to England, or an 
average of 72,500 skins a year.36 Outside of fur bearing animals such as beaver or mink, deer 
hides had the greatest market value, because they were critical to the English leather industry. 
The popularity of buckskin breeches exponentially increased demand for the soft deer leather. 
As one historian surmises, “Buckskin breeches, it seems, served as the eighteenth-century 
equivalent of modern denim jeans.”37 The value of deer skins induced Native peoples to avoid 
employing them for personal use, and eastern Natives increasingly relied on other animals, like 
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the buffalo, for sustenance and utility.38 The industrial revolution of the mid-eighteenth century 
also sparked an increase in demand for a multitude of leather products. Indian hunters played a 
central role in the supply chain. Kentucky offered an abundance of many quadrupeds, long after 
these species were exterminated along the eastern seaboard. By the mid-1700s, Kentucky’s vast 
supply fueled the skin and fur trades, serving as a giant reservoir from which nearby Native 
people extracted wealth. 
By 1750, Kentucky had become a giant hunting preserve that saw only seasonal 
transient occupancy, as hunting parties and mobile villages wandered across it in search of 
game. Still, Kentucky’s value placed it at the center of competition between Native groups, as 
well as venturesome whites who by the middle of the century began entering Kentucky in ever 
greater numbers. For many Indian nations, increasingly dependent on the skin trade, access to 
Kentucky became more important. As one Indian told Virginia explorer David McClure, “The elks 
are our horses, the buffaloes are our cows, the deer are our sheep, & the whites shan’t have 
them.”39  
Indians and Kentucky’s Lands 
Why no Indians called Kentucky home puzzled white travelers. John Findley, while 
traveling in the 1750s, was the last white man to see a permanent Indian settlement in 
Kentucky, and its inhabitants evacuated and burned it shortly after his departure.40 The absence 
of a significant Native American presence in Kentucky ensured the region became the primary 
conduit for Euro-American incursion across the Appalachians. The causes of this vacuum were 
rooted in the geopolitical history of the American Indians. 
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Several Native American groups separated by language, culture, and political affiliation 
claimed Kentucky as a hunting ground. Three main language groups inhabited the eastern 
woodlands at the time of large-scale European contact: the Algic or Algonquian, the Iroquoian, 
and the Muskegon. 41 Algic or Algonquian language families inhabited broad swaths of the 
continent, but in the eastern woodlands, they concentrated around the Great Lakes and along 
the eastern seaboard as far south as the Chesapeake. Algonquin, perhaps the most thoroughly 
researched of Native American languages, consists of dozens of dialects and sub-groupings that 
are mutually unintelligible in varying degrees. These groups had some of the longest and most 
constant contacts with British and French colonists, and so are among the best documented 
Native peoples in America. Two Algonquin groups, the Delaware and Shawnee, were particularly 
active in Kentucky during the Revolutionary period. Iroquoian peoples of the powerful “Six 
Nations Confederacy” and other detached groups, including the Cherokee, also played 
prominent roles in Kentucky. 
The eastern woodland Indians experienced continuous and destructive conflict during 
the seventeenth century. From the time of Hernando De Soto, Native American populations had 
experienced near apocalyptic calamities. Long isolated from the trans-Atlantic world, vulnerable 
Indian populations fell victim to previously unknown diseases throughout the sixteenth century. 
No accurate or reliable figures of the death toll exist, and even estimates remain hotly debated, 
but modern scholars generally accept that Native American populations numbered somewhere 
around thirty million before 1500.42 Smallpox, measles, pertussis, and many other European 
diseases drastically reduced Indian populations, with some scholars estimating declines as high 
as 90 percent. The pandemics ravaged long-lived civilizations throughout the Mississippi Valley. 
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The depopulation of the interior of the country rocked Native American cultures to their core. 
The survivors, who endured successive waves of outbreaks in centuries to come, slowly 
restructured their societies around smaller, subsistence-based communities. Permanent cities 
had all but disappeared from eastern North America by the time of the first French and English 
settlements. As societies regrouped, new power structures and territorial delineations began to 
form around language groupings and produced the world into which the newly arrived 
Europeans inserted themselves.43 
Permanent European settlement further transformed the balance of power in the East. 
In the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley, French contact with the Iroquois produced a series of wars 
more violent and larger in scale than any documented inter-tribal conflicts. After the initial 
confrontation with the French, the Iroquois shifted tactics from direct competition and conflict 
to neutrality and economic exchange with French settlers along the St. Lawrence and with the 
British to the east. As a result, the Iroquois gained access to trade goods and firearms that gave 
them unprecedented power over their western neighbors. In search of captives to rebuild their 
dwindling ranks and beaver pelts to purchase European technology, the Iroquois conducted a 
violent campaign of conquest, driving their Algonquin neighbors before them. Iroquois victories 
in these so called “Mourning” or “Beaver Wars” forged Iroquois claims to the Ohio Valley. 
Iroquois warriors pressed the outgunned inhabitants of the Ohio Valley west, depopulating 
much of the modern Midwest. Groups they did not totally eliminate or assimilate were 
subjugated through treaty. Eventually, the French helped the Algonquins of the pays d’en haut 
defend themselves, forcing the Iroquois to end their campaigns and leading to the Grand 
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Settlement of 1701.44 The Iroquois assault on their neighbors profoundly influenced future 
events in the Ohio Valley.  
The Beaver Wars transformed political structures of the region and led to the 
geographic displacement of Ohio peoples, including the Shawnee. The Shawnee had at one time 
lived in Kentucky, but warfare scattered the tribe in various directions. Following the Shawnee 
diaspora most of the nation fell into an awkward dependence on their Iroquois enemies.45 Most 
of the Shawnee moved to lands in modern central Pennsylvania. It took decades for portions of 
the depleted nation to filter back into the depopulated Ohio Valley. Facing pressures from the 
expansion of the Pennsylvania colony and from antagonistic Six Nations Indians, the Shawnee 
removed west beginning around the 1730s.46 They were soon followed by the Delaware, Mingo, 
Miami and Cayuga fleeing white encroachment and Iroquois hegemony.47 Together, these 
Indian nations helped form a zone that Richard White calls a “Middle Ground” in the Ohio Valley 
and the Old Northwest that offered its Native American inhabitants a degree of autonomy and 
isolation.48 
Virginia’s Claims to the West 
Indian claims to the Ohio Valley placed them in direct competition with the most 
populous and powerful of the thirteen colonies. The “Old Dominion” of Virginia laid claim, albeit 
disputed, to the entire Ohio Valley and beyond. The question of what western lands belonged to 
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Virginia placed it in direct competition with both Native Americans, as well as many other 
colonies. Virginia’s original charter, granted in 1606, stated that the settlers could, “begin theire 
plantacions and habitacions in some fitt and conveniente place between fower and thirtie and 
one and fortie degrees of the said latitude all alongest the coaste of Virginia and coastes of 
America.”49 According to Virginia’s interpretation of the charter, the British crown gave the 
colony authority over the entirety of an area bounded roughly on its north and south by 
present-day New York and South Carolina, and running as far west as Virginia desired. Other 
colonies possessed their own competing charters. Not until 1776, when Virginia drafted its own 
state Constitution, did it recant its claims to the other colonies within its original charter: 
The territories, contained within the Charters, erecting the Colonies of Maryland, 
Pennsylvania,  
North and South Carolina, are hereby ceded, released, and forever confirmed, to the 
people of these Colonies respectively, with all the rights of property, jurisdiction and 
government, and all other rights whatsoever, which might, at any time heretofore, have 
been claimed by Virginia, except the free navigation and use of the rivers Patomaque 
and Pokomoke, with the property of the Virginia shores and strands, bordering on either 
of the said rivers, and all improvements, which have been, or shall be made thereon.50 
However, Virginians held firmly to the unsettled western lands granted by the charter of 1606:  
The western and northern extent of Virginia shall, in all other respects, stand as fixed by 
the Charter of King James I. in the year one thousand six hundred and nine, and by the 
public treaty of peace between the Courts of Britain and France, in the Year one 
thousand seven hundred and sixty-three; unless by act of this Legislature, one or more 
governments be established westward of the Alleghany mountains. And no purchases of 
lands shall be made of the Indian natives, but on behalf of the public, by authority of the 
General Assembly.51 
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These documents established the legal basis for Virginia’s western pretensions. Moreover, this 
important portion of Virginia’s first Constitution points to the underlying forces encouraging 
western expansion in Virginia’s economy, culture, and political power structure. 
A Gentleman’s Club: Planters, Politics, and Profits 
 Virginia elites largely shaped the landholding patterns that evolved in Virginia and 
Kentucky. Historian Louis B. Wright summed up Virginia’s political hierarchy best when he 
wrote, “The tight little aristocracy that developed in Virginia in the later years of the 
seventeenth century quickly gained a power and influence far in excess of the numerical 
importance of its members, who were vastly outnumbered by the yeoman.”52 Elite power 
developed in tandem with the explosion of tobacco cultivation in the Chesapeake. Though 
power shifted away from the Tidewater region and into the Piedmont prior to the Revolution, 
Virginia politics remained the domain of the elites.53 Virginia claimed right of ownership to Ohio 
lands, but wealthy men of the Old Dominion saw the western lands as their own personal 
portfolio.  
 Scholars such as Charles Sydnor have found mostly positive consequences arising from 
Virginia’s oligarchy.54 He argues that Virginia’s political system selected quality candidates for 
public office. This evaluation accurately reflects the success of tobacco culture and the trans-
Atlantic mercantilist system as sources of planter wealth. However, consideration of elite 
involvement in land speculation highlights Lord Acton’s famous maxim, “Absolute power 
corrupts absolutely.” Thomas Perkins Abernathy cautions, “…the most successful speculators 
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and traders” in Virginia “were those who betrayed the public trust and used official position to 
bilk the people.”55 In Virginia, special position meant opportunity. Still, elite exploitation of 
western lands had its limits. Following Virginia’s transfer to the crown in 1624, the colony was 
administered by a governor appointed by the King. The governor worked closely with the local 
political establishment of elected elites who sat in the House of Burgesses. More important, a 
handpicked cabinet of six eminent citizens advised the governor on matters of policy. This small 
group often, with but few exceptions, had the governor on their payroll and their side. Political 
hegemony allowed Virginia’s political elites to turn the western lands provided by the 1606/09 
charter into a massive money making engine. 
 In agrarian Virginia, land ownership meant political enfranchisement and opportunity. 
According to Virginia law, “all and every person, male or female imported and coming into this 
colony and dominion free, has a right to fifty acres of land; and every christian servant, male or 
female imported after he or she becomes free, or time of servitude is expired, has a right to fifty 
acres of land for his or her importation.”56 Virginia’s leaders hoped this law would promote 
immigration to the colony. However, as Robert Beverly stated in his 1705 account the colony, 
History and Present State of Virginia, “Each Servant has… a Right to fifty Acres of Land, where he 
can find any Unpatented: But that is no great Privilege.”57 Planters frequently abused the system 
and pocketed the “head right” of many indentured servants. Each year, new immigrants and 
freed indentured servants pushed further to the outer fringes of settlement in order to find 
unpatented or unsettled land. Since wealthy Virginians controlled the land, they dictated where 
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and when people settled it, manipulated prices, and usurped the best lands on which to grow 
their tobacco.  
The ancient system of “quitrents” also became a source of income and conflict for 
planters. Colonial quitrents were an adaptation of feudalism. Originally, serfs paid quitrents to 
their feudal lord to absolve them from obligatory services. By the seventeenth or eighteenth 
century, quitrents essentially amounted to a property tax due to whichever noble held title to 
the land, though the crown often assessed additional land taxes. The ownership of settled land 
thus had the potential for generating wealth for either the king or the region’s proprietor, as in 
the case of the Fairfax family in the Northern Neck of Virginia and the Penn family in 
Pennsylvania.58 This system meant that land continually generated money for their proprietor or 
the king, no matter who technically owned them. There was much quitrent evasion throughout 
the colonies, but the major burden of payment fell on yeoman freeholders.59 
Virginia’s land barons also exercised exceptional influence over settlement patterns 
along the frontier. Once investors purchased the land, they needed to find suitable tenants or 
buyers. For much of early Virginia’s history, settlers consisted primarily of freed indentured 
servants and recruits from outside the colony. William Byrd’s settling of French Huguenot 
refugees in Manakin Town, Virginia, just north of the fall line offers a perfect example.60 
Typically, planters intentionally settled these individuals along the margins of Virginia’s frontiers 
as a means to ensure the security of the larger plantations and towns further inland. In the 
Shenandoah Valley, for example, Virginia gentlemen controlled and profited from the 
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settlement process in the mid-eighteenth century, even when it took on a remarkably different 
character than they intended.61 
However, common Virginians could acquire their own land. Yeoman purchased land 
from the gentry or on the open market, though many chose the cheaper alternative and 
migrated beyond the protection of the larger settlements to squat on the best available lands on 
the fringe of Indian Territory. Avoiding competition with wealthy speculators, frontier settlers 
invoked the principle of “first come first served.” Settlers “preempted” land by “improving” the 
acreage and proving their residence in the area. Settlers believed that enduring further 
hardships would place them at the front of the line when the time came to lay legal claim to the 
land they had settled. They based their belief on the traditional principle of “preemptive rights” 
or “ancient cultivation,” in which the first individual to take up permanent residence in an area 
received legal title to the land. 62 Colonists had commonly recognized this practice from the 
earliest days of settlement, according to which settlers were entitled to their head right of fifty 
acres, plus an equal amount for every three acres cleared.63 For many settlers, the strong 
attraction of gaining landed wealth relatively quickly outweighed the dangers of the frontier. 
 These factors shaped Virginia’s empire-building process. The Crown exercised minimal 
oversight over the colony. Following the demise of the Virginia Company in 1624, power to 
grant private property rights came from the governor of Virginia. Appointed by the king, the 
governor in turn answered to the royal cabinet in London. Until the mid-eighteenth century, 
governors of the colony distributed most lands directly to lobbying elites. Governors, dependent 
on appropriations from the House of Burgesses for their salaries, and seeking wealth and a 
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return to England, recognized the benefits of enriching the colony’s aristocracy. This cozy 
relationship resulted in massive estates, and land holdings in the tens or hundreds of thousands 
of acres were quite common. Robert Carter, the land agent of the colony, amassed around three 
hundred thousand acres of land.64 Through association with the governor, Benjamin Borden was 
able to accumulate six hundred thousand acres of land.65 Indeed, historian Francis Philbrick has 
surmised that land patenting occupied more of the colonial government’s time than all its other 
activities combined. 66 
Governors who challenged the system found it immovable. Alexander Spotswood, who 
served as governor from 1710 to 1722, soon realized the challenges posed by the Virginia land 
syndicate. An able, energetic, and gracious governor, Spotswood fit in well in chivalrous Virginia 
society, but he prioritized the interests of the crown over the interests of the local gentry. Small 
planters protested Spotswood’s unpopular tobacco inspection law, which imposed quality 
restrictions on tobacco exports intended to decrease supply and shore up prices. The governor 
also promoted other reforms, including more exact quitrent records, the forfeiture of 
unimproved land after three years, and the reassertion of royal prerogative in the colony. These 
policies alienated many of the leading planter-speculators, men such William Byrd, John Custis, 
John Lewis, Robert Carter, Philip Ludwell, Henry Duke, and John Smith. Unfortunately for 
Spotswood, these men also sat on the council.67 When Spotswood tried to bring suit against 
those who refused to comply with the new law, he found the relatives of council members 
staffing the colony’s judicial system. Checked at every turn, the governor resigned. Spotswood 
cut a deal with his erstwhile enemies in exchange for 86,650 acres of Virginia real estate, and 
established a dynasty that became deeply integrated into the Virginia establishment, even 
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founding the colony’s first major iron foundry.68 The House of Burgesses and council members 
who brokered the deal received seventy-one thousand acres for their efforts. In the end, land 
was the one commodity to which no governor dared restrict access. Land seems to have 
corrupted even the hitherto scrupulous Spotswood. In the following decades, the oligarchy of 
Virginia expanded the volume and raised the stakes of land speculation to new extremes. 
The Virginia Land Companies and the Seven Years War 
For a time, western settlement focused on the great valleys of the Appalachians like the 
Shenandoah. However, as settlement pressed further west, speculation moved even faster, 
pushing speculators’ involvement into areas of direct interest to the Crown. Both the French and 
the English claimed the Ohio Country, but Indians hostile to Euro-American domination 
inhabited it. Though the speculators faced steep financial and personal risks, they found the 
opportunities even more enticing. Virginians took the lead in moving beyond the Blue Ridge 
Mountains into this new and more dangerous territory. Old Dominion speculators, a future 
president, and the famous land company that represented them ignited a tinderbox in the trans-
Appalachian West. 
By the 1740s, much of the best land in Virginia’s Piedmont, Tidewater, Northern Neck, 
Southside, and Shenandoah Valley were claimed or under plow. Settlers and speculators looked 
with increasing interest at the lands west of the Blue Ridge Mountains. The council granted the 
first western patent in 1743 along the Greenbrier River in present day West Virginia to John 
Robinson and his Greenbrier Company. Thomas Lee, also a member of the council, began openly 
campaigning for a grant of five hundred thousand acres for his new Ohio Company, in which 
many leading Virginians such as George Mason and several Washingtons invested.69 The land 
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that Lee and his associates sought lay in the disputed Ohio Country. When Virginia Governor 
William Gooch doubted his authority to grant land in the region, Lee appealed to the British 
Board of Trade. With powerful friends such as John Hansbury lobbying on Lee’s behalf in the 
London merchant community, the company’s grant request secured approval in 1749 on the 
condition that it build a fort in the region and settle one hundred families on the land within 
seven years. The British leadership sought to use this new settlement to check “the 
encroachments of the French by interrupting part of their communication.”70  
Opposition soon arose to the Ohio Company’s claims. It faced serious rivals in the 
Pennsylvania fur trading syndicates, as well as major land speculation companies, some of them 
owned by rival Virginians. The Loyal Company, headed by Dr. Thomas Walker, posed the 
greatest threat. Walker’s Loyal Company claimed eight hundred thousand acres in the region 
south of the Ohio, in present-day Kentucky. Not only did the two company’s claims overlap, but 
they promised to collide in the future as settlement expanded along the north bank of the Ohio 
River. The Loyal Company moved quickly, sending Walker west in 1750 to explore the 
company’s claims in what is now Kentucky.71   
The Ohio Company also had well placed friends. Virginia’s new governor, Robert 
Dinwiddie, invested in the company. He wrote to Thomas Cresap in 1752, stating, “I have the 
Success and Prosperity of the Ohio Company much at heart.”72 Moreover, the Ohio Company 
devised a more aggressive strategy than their competitors. The company sent adventurer and 
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Indian agent Christopher Gist to explore the Ohio Valley just as Walker returned from his foray. 
Gist fulfilled two missions as he traveled through portions of Kentucky, crossed the Falls of the 
Ohio, and continued into Indiana and Ohio. First, he scouted and surveyed the best lands along 
his route. Second, he sought to legitimize Ohio Company activities in the region by cultivating 
relationships with Native American inhabitants who strongly opposed white settlement.73 Later 
in 1752, Gist helped negotiate the Logstown Treaty with the Iroquois leader Tanacharison who 
permitted the company to build a fort at the Forks of the Ohio.74 
In early 1754, a small party of Ohio Company employees began construction of Fort 
Prince George at the Forks of the Ohio to counter the chain of French forts under construction in 
the region. Upon hearing news of Virginia’s activities in the Ohio Country, the French marched 
south and forced the small Virginia construction party to abandon their effort, though not 
before they sold their tools to the French. The French used these tools to construct the larger 
Fort Duquesne, named for their commander, Michel-Ange Du Quesne de Menneville, Marquis 
Du Quesne.75 A young George Washington, also a member of the Ohio Company, took command 
of a relief force, and commenced hostilities with the French when he arrived at the Forks of the 
Ohio. The disastrous series of skirmishes that followed provided the spark for the global Seven 
Years War. Victory in 1763 and the terms of the Treaty of Paris left nearly all of France’s North 
America colonies under British control. However, British attempts to grapple with the costs of 
war shaped future relations with the North American colonies and sowed the seeds of colonial 
rebellion. As for the Ohio Company, it paid dearly for the conflict it started. The company never 
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fulfilled the requirements of its charter and it lapsed.76 The long war on the frontier destroyed 
the Loyal Company as well. However, that Virginia’s interests aligned so well with the interests 
of the Ohio Company reveals the depth of the relationship between land speculation companies 
and the colony’s government. 
Washington and his fellow Virginians were heavily involved in the frontier battles of the 
Seven Years War. However, aside from the men associated with the Ohio Company, few leading 
Virginians actively supported the war effort. The House of Burgesses refused to provide 
adequate funding, and only begrudgingly supported opportunities that would, as historian Fred 
Anderson surmises, “give an unpopular governor carte blanche to start a war that, for all they 
knew, would be no more than a pretext to expand the scope of the prerogative in Virginia 
government while enriching him and his Ohio Company cronies at public expense.”77 Still, the 
war deeply affected Virginia and the process of western expansion. Throughout the conflict, 
Virginia’s government and its wealthy land speculating politicians viewed the West as their 
inheritance. Successive Virginia governors used western lands as a tool of military recruitment. 
Moreover, at the end of hostilities, wealthy Virginians saw western lands as fairly won and ripe 
for exploitation. 
Speculation, Veterans’ Grants, and the Proclamation of 1763 
For Governor Dinwiddie, land offered the best available tool to boost sluggish military 
recruitment. Land meant status in colonial Virginia. Ownership of land meant a political voice, 
the right to vote, self-sufficiency, and constituted the surest means to financial solvency. In 
February 1754, Dinwiddie issued a proclamation offering land bounties to anyone willing to fight 
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for the Virginia line in the Seven Years War.78 These bounties came directly from the Ohio 
Company’s grant. By awarding company land to those who fought, Dinwiddie attempted to buy 
support for the war effort. Two hundred thousand acres were to be distributed to veterans 
immediately following the expulsion of the French from the region.79 Unfortunately for the 
soldiers, that process took four years, and most sold their bounties at a bargain to men like 
George Washington. Likewise, many Ohio Company investors opposed the governor’s action as 
it cut deeply into the company’s profits. Real settlement around the forks of the Ohio would not 
occur until hostilities ceased in 1763. 
Even with the French menace gone, however, settlement west of the Appalachians still 
faced obstructions. Native Americans, realizing the serious implications of French defeat, 
continued the war with England under the figurative direction of Algonquin chief Pontiac. 
Pontiac’s rebellion represented the first serious concerted Native American effort to challenge 
whites on the frontier. The violence forced the British to choose between a conciliatory 
approach and a protracted Indian war.80 The insolvent British government chose peace because 
it could ill afford an extended conflict with the Indians, and embarked on a series of 
appeasement policies, culminating in the proclamation of 1763, which barred most white 
settlement beyond the western face of the Appalachians. The proclamation directly targeted the 
activities of Virginians who sought to gain land by treaties with Indians, and who had done so 
much to precipitate the last conflict. The Proclamation stated:  
Great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the 
great Prejudice of our Interests and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians: In order, 
therefore, to prevent such Irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians may 
be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of 
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Discontent, We do with the Advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin and require that no 
private Person do presume to make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands 
reserved to the said Indians.81 
 
For the first time, the barrier to western expansion came not from geography, Native warriors, 
or French regulars, but from the British government itself. Officially, the proclamation cut the 
Ohio Valley off from settlement and speculation, and thus denied Virginia’s elites of what they 
considered theirs by right of conquest. George Mercer, secretary of the Ohio Company, spent 
years in London lobbying for the proclamation’s repeal.82 
The Proclamation of 1763 played a key role in fomenting the American Revolution, and 
helped push the leading men of Virginia into the conflict. Writing of George Washington, the 
historian W. E. Woodward notes, “A map of his political views in the pre-Revolutionary period 
would be simply a map of the Western Territory, with a few disappointing financial statements 
from his London agents tacked onto one corner.”83 Washington was particularly land obsessed, 
but his behavior reflected that of many of the Old Dominion’s leading patriots, most of whom 
had invested in one land company or another.  
 The Proclamation of 1763 slowed but only briefly deterred speculators from their work. 
The lands beyond the Appalachians proved too enticing. The years between the end of the 
Seven Years War and the beginning of the Revolution saw the most active surveying of the West 
yet undertaken. Technically illegal, these activities took on a clandestine nature. Few feared 
detection, however, as most members of the political establishment participated in land 
speculation. In reality, the greatest risk was that a competitor would discover one’s speculative 
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or surveying activities. Again, Washington stands as a good example. In a letter to William 
Crawford dated September 21, 1767, Washington wrote: 
I offered in my last [letter] to join you in attempting to secure some of the most valuable 
lands in the King’s part, which I think may be accomplished after a while, 
notwithstanding the proclamation that restrains it at present, and prohibits the settling 
of them all; for I can never look upon that proclamation in any other light (but this I say 
between ourselves) than as a temporary expedient to quiet the minds of the Indians.84 
 
Washington viewed the Proclamation of 1763 as temporary. Likewise, he knew that others held 
the same opinion and pursued similar schemes to his own: 
I recommend, that you keep this whole matter a secret… for several good 
reasons…First… because I might be censured for the opinion I have in respect to the 
King’s proclamation, and then, if the scheme I am now proposing to you were known, it 
might give the alarm to others, and by putting them upon a plan of the same nature, 
before we could lay a proper foundation for success ourselves… All this can be avoided… 
under the guise of hunting game, which I presume, effectually do, at the same time you 
are in pursuit of land.85 
 
Washington stressed the urgency of the situation to his associate: “Any person therefore who 
neglects the present opportunity of hunting out good lands, and in some measure marking and 
distinguishing them for his own… will never regain it.”86 Washington’s sentiments were mirrored 
by many of the colony’s speculators, who still viewed the West as their own backyard. In 1773, 
Washington asked Crawford to survey ten thousand acres at the Falls of the Ohio for patent, 
well beyond the boundary line established in 1763.87 The proclamation did nothing to slow or 
prevent speculative activities. Indeed, this period saw fierce competition between land 
companies from Virginia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and even Britain.88 
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Treaties 
Even as the Proclamation of 1763 barred the way to settlement, speculators worked to 
secure treaties with the Native Americans who lived on the frontier. Representing land 
companies, colonial governments, wealthy benefactors, and their own private interests, agents 
sought cessions from the Indians to legitimize their claims over their western surveys in the 
event the Proclamation line was repealed. Kentucky became the focus of many of these treaties. 
In most cases, speculators sought not to negotiate with the Indians for permission to control the 
land, but rather to preempt competitors in any future legal battles over shaky western claims. 
Regardless of the Proclamation of 1763, speculative activities continued with an eye to the 
“Camden and Yorke Opinion” of 1757.89 Delivered by the attorney and solicitor generals of 
England and Wales, the opinion stated that British courts would consider deeds purchased from 
indigenous landholders valid. Though the decision dealt with purchases of the East India 
Company on the Indian sub-continent, it became the primary legal justification for purchasing 
lands from Native Americans. For example, William Murray, land speculator and promoter of 
the Illinois Company, used the decision to justify his failed 1773 bid to purchase land in the 
Illinois Country.90 
Thus, the signing of Indian treaties continued through the period between the end of 
the Seven Years War and the American Revolution. A series of treaties, the most important of 
which was the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768), demarcated the borders of the territory that 
eventually became Kentucky. Like the Treaty of Logstown before it, British agents who 
negotiated the Fort Stanwix treaty dealt with the key Native American power brokers on the 
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frontier. Sir William Johnson secured a land cession from the Iroquois of the Six Nations that 
fixed the region’s borders on the northern bank of the Ohio River.91 By the treaty, the Iroquois 
ceded all lands “beginning at the Mouth of Cherokee or Hogohege River where it emptys into 
the River Ohio and running from thence upwards along the South side of said River to Kittaning 
which is above Fort Pitt.” 92 By deeding this land away to the British control, the Iroquois 
diverted white migration away from their western New York heartland, and into land occupied 
by other Indian nations. 
The Ohio Indians most affected by the Fort Stanwix Treaty never consented to the 
annexation of their hunting grounds. Unlike Logstown, the Shawnees, Mingoes, Delawares, and 
Cherokees living in the vicinity of Kentucky did not even attend the Fort Stanwix proceedings.93 
These nations were nominally subordinate to the Iroquois according to the Grand Settlement of 
1701 and other subsequent agreements brokered by the British. But by the time of Fort Stanwix, 
the Ohio Indians were rising in power, and the Iroquois could little guarantee the bargain that 
sold Kentucky to the British.94 Ohio Indians never accepted the Six Nation’s hegemony over their 
foreign affairs and never acknowledged the legitimacy of the treaty. As historian Richard White 
notes, “The Treaty of Fort Stanwix stands as the most tangled agreement reached by Indians 
and whites in the eighteenth century. At root, it was a cynical compact born in the mutual 
weakness of its two major parties: the Iroquois and the British Empire. Both spoke for peoples – 
the Algonquians and the backcountry settlers – whom, in fact, they could not control.”95 With so 
many competing interests, the British sought out those parties that would agree to a redrawn 
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western boundary. The British never consulted the Ohio Indians because they would never have 
consented to this exchange. 
Like the Iroquois, the Cherokee had less direct control over Kentucky’s lands than the 
Ohio Indians. However, conciliatory elements within the Cherokee nation willingly bargained 
away regions north of the Tennessee River. A series of treaties with the Cherokee gave the 
claims of white speculators varying degrees of legitimacy. As at Logstown, pseudo-official 
Virginians took the lead. The Cherokee bargained away portions of Virginia’s advancing frontier 
at the 1768 Treaty of Hard Labor, the Treaty of Lochaber in 1770, and the Treaty and Purchase 
of 1772, the latter agreement ceding Cherokee claims to the Bluegrass.96  
Explorers and Long Hunters: White Men in an Indian Hunting Ground 
Virginia’s settlers and speculators openly challenged the Proclamation of 1763. Groups 
of white men continued to cross into the western territories with impunity. As pressures 
mounted along the proclamation line, hunters, explorers, speculators, and surveyors entered 
Kentucky. What these men saw amazed them. The first Anglo explorations of Kentucky occurred 
prior to the Seven Years War. Thomas Walker and Christopher Gist, members of major 
speculative ventures, each traveled through Kentucky in the 1750s. Gist claimed that he “could 
sometimes see forty or fifty Buffalos feeding at once.”97 Living with the Shawnee through the 
winter of 1750-51, Gist learned much about Native customs, cultures, and hunting practices. He 
recorded killing many buffalo, usually only to “[take] out their tongues” or “a little… breast 
meat.”98 Gist’s wasteful use of the buffalo typified men on the move who treated game as 
modern “fast food” and left the bulk of their prey to rot. 
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Dr. Thomas Walker, who left a far more detailed journal than Gist, also saw many a 
buffalo on his journey through Kentucky. Walker’s party killed a buffalo almost every day of the 
expedition. When they stopped to provision at Roanoke, Virginia at the very western extremities 
of English settlement, he found a disturbing reality: “We went to the great Lick on A Branch of 
Staunton & bought corn of Michael Campbell for our Horses. This Lick has been one of the best 
places for Game in these parts and would have been of much greater advantage to the 
Inhabitants than it has been if the Hunters had not killed the Buffaloes for diversion, and the 
Elks and Deer for their skins.”99 The place where Colonel Byrd’s party had once killed a buffalo 
during their 1705 expedition was not far from this area. However, by Walker’s time, the buffalo 
were near extinction east of the Appalachians. Subsisting almost exclusively on hunting and 
foraging, Walker’s party traveled part of the way on a “buffalo road… which we took and found 
the Ascent and Descent tolerably easie.”100 Walker’s party continued to follow buffalo traces 
during their journey. Though the journey was fraught with peril, the men subsisted on, “13 
Buffaloes, 8 elks, 53 bears, 20 deer, 4 Wild Geese, about 150 Turkeys, and besides small game” 
during their six-month long expedition. Walker also claimed, “We might have killed three times 
as much meat if we had wanted it.”101 Walker and his party had not seen the richest portions of 
Kentucky. They had missed both the Bluegrass and the “barrens,” and had still seen a herd of “a 
hundred Buffaloes.”102 Without seeing Kentucky’s greatest abundance, Gist and Walker saw 
enough to suggest, as Gist remarked, “it wants nothing but cultivation to make it the most 
delightful Country.”103  
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The promise of rich and virgin lands for the taking deeply excited land speculators back 
east. Indeed, the excitement led the speculators of the Ohio Company to spark an international 
war with France. Part of Gist’s operations included negotiations with Native Americans on the 
subject of land cessions in Ohio country. Just before the war began a future associate of Daniel 
Boone, John Findley, established a trading post at one of the last Indian settlements in Kentucky, 
near what would later be called Blue Licks. He told Nathan Boone, Daniel Boone’s son, that “Of 
bears and buffaloes, elk and deer, their number was legion; and at many of the salt-licks of the 
country, they congregated in such prodigious herds, that the sight was truly grand and 
amazing.”104 Men like Findley came to the region drawn by Gist and Walker’s reports. Less than 
a year after Finley arrived at the Indian village, however, war broke out, and the town burned 
and abandoned.105  Gist and Walker’s glowing reports attracted an increasing volume of white 
frontiersmen and speculators.  The frictions this created helped spark the Seven Years War.  
After the conflict, a new class of men ventured deep into Kentucky. Known as “long-
hunters” men like Daniel Boone, Simon Kenton, James Knox, and others sought to poach in 
these exceptional hunting grounds and scout the region for future settlement.106  Long hunters 
mimicked Indian use of Kentucky’s animal population.  Buffalo meat, for example, was prized on 
the frontier. When living off the land, as many hunters did, a buffalo offered an excellent 
alternative to shoe leather. Frontiersmen also learned to produce important products from the 
buffalo, including boats, shelters, oil and clothing, all manufactured in the field. Thus, long 
hunters never hesitated to shoot a buffalo given its many uses.  In 1851, for example, Nathan 
Boone recalled that his father once killed nine buffalo to build a boat from their hides.107  Long 
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hunters found buffalo encounters both exhilarating and dangerous. When exploring French Lick, 
in the vicinity of present-day Nashville, Isaac Bledsoe’s party of ten long hunters saw an 
abundance of Buffalo in the region’s savannas. In one case, “Bledsoe… found an area about one 
hundred acres so crowded with buffalo and other animals that he was afraid to dismount from 
his horse lest he should be run over and trampled to death. He shot two deer, but the carcasses 
were so trampled in the mire about the licks that he could not skin them.”108 Bledsoe thought 
“the numbers of buffalo there to be estimated not only in the hundreds, but the thousands.”109  
While these vast herds of buffalo provided raw materials in the field, long hunters 
poached deer, bear, and elk for sale back east.  These frontiersmen greatly accelerated the 
volume of the destruction of Kentucky’s herds. In the early 1760s, for example, John Knox led a 
party of forty long hunters into Green River barrens in western Kentucky.  After hunting and 
trapping all that they could, they left over two-thousand deerskins behind, unable to carry 
them.110 
 The growing number of white incursions into Kentucky drew the interest of Shawnee 
and Delaware warriors intent on ending such encroachments. On several of Boone’s travels to 
Kentucky, Indians waylaid and captured him, confiscated his furs, and threatened his life. When 
Boone’s hunting party ran into a Shawnee band in Kentucky in 1769, the Indian leader Captain 
Will warned Boone, “Go home and stay there…. And if you are foolish as to venture here again, 
you may be sure the wasps and yellow-jackets will sting you severely."111 They did so in 1774, 
when Boone led his family and friends on an abortive settlement attempt. Shawnee, Delaware, 
and Cherokee warriors captured, tortured, and killed Boone’s son, James, during an attack.  
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Lord Dunmore’s War 
As Virginia’s population grew, yeoman, squatters, and all manner of immigrants and 
young men looked to the West as their future home. Virginia’s western counties quickly began 
to fill as settlement traced its way down the Appalachian valleys. In 1772, population growth 
prompted the Virginia legislature to split Fincastle County off from Botetourt County. Though 
remote and settled predominantly by non-English immigrants, Fincastle County, like many of 
Virginia’s other western counties, was still controlled by the same aristocracy that dominated 
the rest of the colony. A list of names appointed to the first Fincastle county court including 
William Preston, William Ingles, William Christian, John Montgomery, Stephen Trigg, Arthur 
Campbell, William Russell, Benjamin Estill, Samuel Crockett, and Alexander Mckee, 
demonstrates the gentry’s political dominance of the western counties. Historian George M. 
Chinn summarizes the connections between the new western gentry and prominent men in 
longer settled regions of the Old Dominion:  
Most of them had served as officers in the French and Indian War and were thus 
entitled to grants of land in the West. In addition, they were on intimate terms with the 
highest military and civil officials in Virginia, among them George Washington and Hugh 
Mercer, as well as the King’s appointed ministers. Christian was the brother-in-law of 
Patrick Henry.112 
 
These connections helped to ensure the continued hegemony of the Virginia elite over the 
western counties.  
Boone’s failed attempt to colonize Kentucky proved the opening salvo of what became 
Lord Dunmore’s War. This conflict represented a new chapter in the long, drawn out Indian wars 
that lasted until 1815, when the Indians lost British support. Lord Dunmore’s War opened the 
floodgates to white settlement. Evidence suggests that Dunmore incited the conflict, utilizing 
the Boone family tragedy and others like it as a pretense to seize land from the Shawnee. In 
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1774, Thomas Wharton described Patrick Henry’s reaction when asked about “the real 
intentions of Dunmore for prosecuting this unjust war.” Henry replied, “his Lordship was 
determined to settle his family in America, and he was really pursuing this war in order to obtain 
by purchase or treaty from the Natives a tract of territory.”113 Colonel William Preston, advisor 
to Lord Dunmore and future Kentucky speculator, happily supported the governor, saying, “The 
Oppertunity we have so long wished for, is now before us.”114  
Dunmore had called for a survey of Kentucky’s lands in 1772, then organized an 
expedition the following year that sought to survey possible land grants for veterans of the 
Seven Years War.115 The expedition attracted many veterans. Wealthy men like Washington, 
Hugh Mercer, and Henry took a keen interest in its success, hoping to profit from successful 
claims. Two of Kentucky’s founders, James Harrod and Boone, led parties down the Ohio River 
and over land respectively. However, both expeditions quickly faltered in the face of Indian 
attacks, with Boone’s party assaulted in the Cumberland Gap area.116 Harrod returned to 
Kentucky the following spring and with a few dozen men established the short-lived settlement 
of Harrodstown not far from the Kentucky River. They spent weeks surveying land, making 
improvements, and erecting thirty-seven cabins throughout the Bluegrass in hopes of securing 
preemptive rights.117 However, the escalating hostilities of Dunmore’s War convinced the party 
to hurry back east. Shawnee raiders promptly burned the improvements as the war began in 
earnest in the fall. Following Virginia’s 1774 victory over the Ohio Indians at Point Pleasant, the 
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Shawnee signed the Treaty of Camp Charlotte.118 Most Ohio Indians ignored the treaty, but 
Virginians soon returned to Kentucky and never left.  
First Settlements and the Coming Revolution 
Prior to Dunmore’s War, exploration and settlements in Kentucky took place 
clandestinely and illegally – with the exception of the ill-fated Vandalia project – and failed to 
produce permanent settlement.119 Settlers hesitated to move to a place that offered little legal 
or physical security. The conclusion of Dunmore’s War gave these men greater confidence. 
Harrod and Boone began to prepare for a return to Kentucky in 1775. However, settlers must 
have wondered whether they had the support of Virginia and her governor. On January 28, 
1775, Dunmore issued a cryptic proclamation announcing the terms of the Treaty of Camp 
Charlotte in the Virginia Gazette: “The Shawanese from whose Incursions the most dreadful 
Effects were felt… have agreed not to hunt on this Side of the Ohio, and have solemnly promised 
not to molest any Passengers on the Rivers, but, on the contrary, to give them every Assistance, 
and Protection.” 120 Though the initial statement seemed encouraging, Dunmore also cautioned, 
“I HAVE therefore thought fit, with the Advice of his Majesty’s Council, to issue this 
Proclamation, hereby requiring all Persons in the Government straightly to refrain from 
committing any Violence upon, or doing an Injury to Indians of whatsoever Tribe or Nation, and 
from every Encroachment upon their Territory which may give them Cause of Complaint.”121 
Dunmore added, “I do direct and command all Magistrates and other Officers to be aiding and 
assisting in preserving the Peace now established, by immediately apprehending the Violators of 
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it, and protecting the Indians by every Means in their Power.”122 To make matters more 
confusing, the bulk of the paper in which Dunmore placed his proclamation contained coverage 
and analysis of the First Continental Congress. The Old Dominion was tense as the first bands of 
permanent settlers prepared to set out for Kentucky.  
At the same time North Carolina speculator and politician Richard Henderson attempted 
to gain control of all the lands between the Green, Ohio, and Cumberland Rivers. Henderson and 
several other North Carolina investors formed the Transylvania Land Company to found a colony 
in the trans-Appalachian West. Henderson met with the Cherokee and negotiated the private 
land grab known as the Treaty of Sycamore Shoals (1775). Boone and other frontiersmen 
attended the conference, as did Dragging Canoe, the great Cherokee resistance fighter. 
Disgusted by the proceedings, Dragging Canoe was reported to have said: “We have given you 
this, why do you ask for more?... When you have this you have all.  There is no game left 
between the Watauga and the Cumberland.  There is a cloud hanging over it.  You will find its 
settlement dark and bloody.”123  Despite the threat, Henderson dispatched Boone to blaze the 
famed “Wilderness Trail” overland into the Bluegrass before negotiations were concluded. 
Through the month of March, Boone and a party of thirty men cut their way across Kentucky in 
a race to open the region to the Transylvania Colony’s settlers and preempt the best lands 
before others could arrive. Not until July did Boone’s party build a fort, in part because they 
suffered several Indian attacks. More important, the men were far more interested in surveying 
land for preemption than in preparing for the common defense.124 
Both Boone and his party had a real sense of urgency. They faced many unknowns, 
including a dramatic shift in Virginia politics. As the men chopped trees and surveyed property 
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lines, Virginia’s leaders opted for armed rebellion against Great Britain. During the summer of 
1775 the colonies began to throw off their colonial governors, and Virginia’s cadre of patriotic 
aristocrats were already participating in the Second Continental Congress in open defiance of 
Dunmore, who now directed an intensifying military campaign against Virginia’s militia. As the 
colony prepared for war, events in Kentucky seemed of little consequence. However, following 
independence and a grinding war effort, Virginia began to take a keen interest in her western 
lands. But Virginia’s gentry-dominated political and social framework struggled to adapt to the 
complex landscape on its western frontier. 
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CHAPTER 2: LAWS, LAND, AND WAR 
 Kentucky, Virginia, and the Revolutionary War 
 The Revolution redefined Virginia’s relationship with the West. Prior to the war, British 
policy and Native American resistance had confined Virginians to the eastern slope of the 
Appalachians. Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774 had rekindled conflict with the Native Americans 
and opened up the possibility of new territorial gains. National independence from Great Britain 
removed the paper barriers to expansion. In a few short years, the limited encroachments of 
long hunters, explorers, and traders turned into permanent settlements, open war, and a 
dramatic transformation of the land. The Revolution in the West remains noteworthy for its 
brutality as well as its role in shaping the future course of American expansion, and in forging 
the foundational relationships between western settlers and their eastern counterparts.  
While historians often discuss Virginia’s role in Kentucky’s formation in terms of state 
and national politics, the social and economic trends at work during Revolutionary era were the 
engines that moved the process. From the humble settler to the governor of the state, 
individual Virginians had a personal interest in the status in the state’s western territories. 
Concern about western lands contributed to the economic, political, military, and philosophical 
debates within the Old Dominion. The following narrative traces Virginia’s complex relationship 
with Kentucky in the first years of the American Revolution until the passage of the land laws of 
1779. 
 
 
 
 
46 
  
The Revolutionary War in Virginia 
 As the most populous state in the new United States, the Old Dominion provided much 
of the Revolution’s leadership and was the site of several important campaigns. Economic, 
political, and demographic issues propelled Virginia to open revolt against Britain. Increased 
immigration from Europe, Africa, and other American colonies swelled the Virginia’s population 
from one hundred thirty thousand to four hundred thousand in the twenty-five years preceding 
the Revolution.125 Available land became increasingly rare – a fact compounded by the 
Proclamation of 1763 – and many of the new arrivals either joined a growing class of tenant 
farmers or chose to face the rigors of Virginia’s backcountry. Additionally, the colony dealt with 
a decade-long slump in the value of tobacco, the colony’s primary staple crop. Several natural 
disasters, the specter of increased taxation, Enlightenment ideology, racial tension, and crushing 
personal debt, particularly among the elite, produced a society poised for political turmoil.126 
These factors fostered an alliance between the gentry and the yeomanry. The landed 
and politically enfranchised classes largely supported the Revolution, while the merchant class 
and the more marginalized segments of society provided only limited support. Historians Woody 
Holton and Michael McDonnell suggest that Virginians’ support for independence was far from 
universal, and the actions of freeholders, slaves, and Indians profoundly influenced the decisions 
of Virginia’s elite leadership.127 Virginia’s leaders formulated the Revolutionary ideology and 
directed the war effort, but popular support remained lukewarm, sapped in part by the realities 
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and deprivations of war. Indeed, as Michael McDonnell demonstrates, Virginia consistently 
failed to entice young men to join the Virginia line and fight beyond the state’s borders.  
Virginia’s military leaders focused their recruitment efforts on laborers and the landless, while 
avoiding slaveholders and freeholders. Though Virginia had the largest population of the former 
colonies it provided a far lower proportion of soldiers than did northern states like 
Massachusetts. Virginia leaders struggled mightily to build a coalition of willing partners to 
prosecute the war even within the state’s borders. 128 Additionally, the huge population of 
slaves in Virginia tied down many potential soldiers. Blacks more often supported the Crown, 
which offered manumission to runaways who joined the ranks of the British Army, forcing the 
patriots to mimic British policy to circumvent its effectiveness.129 British forces waged a 
protracted war of raids and skirmishing along Virginia’s coast, and made several forays into the 
interior, including a 1779 attack that resulted in the burning of the new capital of Richmond.130 
Sluggish recruitment and weak militia support meant that Virginia’s war effort nearly always 
lagged behind that of its northern neighbors. 
The Revolution in Kentucky 
Not only did the leadership of the Old Dominion struggle to build an effective internal 
coalition, it utterly failed to pacify Native Americans. For Indians up and down the Ohio River, 
colonial settlers rather than the British posed the greatest risk to their welfare. Virginia’s 
western territories saw some of the heaviest fighting between Ohio Indians and white settlers in 
these years. Indeed, Lord Dunmore’s War represented the first in a long series of conflicts 
between the Ohio Indians and Euro-American settlers that lasted almost unabated until the 
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Treaty of Fort Meigs in 1817.131 With British material, logistical, and occasionally human support 
the Ohio Indians tried to destroy the new beachheads of settlement in Kentucky and along the 
banks of the Ohio River. 
Scholars have paid little attention to the campaigns of the western theater of the 
American Revolution. At the beginning of the war, Virginia’s leadership shared this attitude. 
They viewed the western counties as strategically insignificant, and focused their attention on 
eastern Virginia. They employed the state’s scarce resources in the defense of the Tidewater, 
slave control, and fulfilling Virginia’s national commitments. Among the settlers in Virginia’s 
western counties frustration with the lack of support from the mother state festered throughout 
the war. As late as 1781, Virginia’s western counties suffered from a lack of manpower. As 
Kentucky settler John Floyd suggested:  
It is now beyond a doubt that the attention of at least 6000 Savage Warriors is fixed on  
this spot and who will not disturb any other part of the Continent as long as we maintain  
our Ground. But on the contrary as soon as this Country is laid waste they will  
immediately fall on the Inhabitants of Washington, Montgomery, and Greenbrier & in  
short from South Carolina to Pennsylvania. I believe all the Counties on the west side  
the blue Ridge were kept for many years penned up in Forts by the Shawaneese,  
Mingoes, Delawares, & a few of their Adherents; if so what will be the consequence  
when at least fifteen powerful Nations are united and combined with those above  
mentioned against about twelve hundred Militia dispersed over  
three very extensive Counties. Those Nations have absolutely been hitherto kept off 
your back Settlements by the Inhabitants of Kentucky.132 
 
Floyd’s assessment was certainly hyperbolic. The Ohio Indians never assembled more than a few 
thousand warriors in their greatest campaigns. Native warriors could not force the surrender of 
the outgunned militia at Boonesborough in 1777, making the prospect of a pan-Indian invasion 
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of Virginia unlikely. Yet Floyd’s words offer a window into the sense of isolation felt by western 
settlers, and the growing gulf between East and West. 
 Dramatic swings of momentum characterized the war in Virginia’s western counties, 
with the outcome often in doubt. Though the Indians carried out no major attacks in 1776, 
random raids into Kentucky drove many settlers back across the Appalachians. Daniel Boone and 
Colonel Richard Calloway each had daughters kidnapped by a Shawnee raiding party.133 The 
Boone’s dramatic rescue of the girls added to his mystique, but a general sense of foreboding 
hung over the frontier. The Kentucky militia’s manpower was much depleted as settlers hurried 
back to the relative safety of their respective points of origin. By early July 1776, John Floyd 
counted only thirty riflemen at Boonesborough.134 1776-77 saw continued raiding on both sides. 
Though small in scale, these raids had deadly results. In 1777, Shawnee warriors delivered 
seventy-seven prisoners and 129 scalps to Henry Hamilton, the British commander of Detroit.135 
The following year, Shawnee raiders captured Boone and several of his compatriots. 
After living with the Indians for several months, Boone escaped and returned to Boonesborough 
just ahead of an invasion force numbering roughly five hundred Shawnee warriors and British 
militia led by Chief Blackfish. During the dramatic eleven-day siege of the fort in September, 
Boone and his comrades held off the Indian invaders against overwhelming odds, further 
embellishing the Boone mythology. While the Shawnee failed to destroy the critical 
fortifications at Boonesborough and Harrodsburg, the Shawnee raids virtually eliminated white 
settlement in the surrounding area.  
                                                          
133
 Faragher, Boone, 131-39. 
134
 William Stewart Lester, The Transylvania Colony (Spencer, Ind: S.R. Guard & Co, 1935), 16. 
135
 Michael A. Lofaro, Daniel Boone: An American Life (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003), 83. 
 
 
50 
  
While 1777-78 represented the low point for Kentucky’s white population, the Indians 
failed to drive them from their beachhead in the region.136 The conflict along the Ohio dragged 
on for five more years, with neither side able to achieve its strategic goals. Though the Shawnee 
and their allies enjoyed a few dramatic victories, the Indians never completely eliminated white 
settlements. In 1782, three hundred fifty Native Americans and British loyalists under the 
command of William Caldwell delivered a devastating defeat to a force of Kentucky militia Blue 
Licks. This battle occurred months after General Charles Cornwallis’s April 1781 surrender at 
Yorktown, illustrating the isolated nature of the western conflict which continued despite 
changing conditions in the East. Despite the continued fighting, settlers viewed the survival of 
the forts as harbingers of victory, and Kentucky’s population grew quickly as the perception of 
security improved. 
George Rogers Clark and the Campaign in the Old Northwest 
Indian and pioneer raids crisscrossed the Ohio River throughout the war. The endless 
cycle of reprisals and killings garnered interest from Virginia’s leaders, whose western efforts 
focused primarily on dislodging British garrisons in Northwest. In fact, Virginia did not officially 
appropriate any money or material support to offensive campaigns in the West until 1779.137 
Prior to 1778, the fighting in Kentucky took place between local settlers and Indians supported 
by the British in Detroit. However, Virginia Governor Patrick Henry sought more than the tactical 
defeat of the state’s British and Native American foes in the Ohio Valley. Instead, he envisioned 
loftier strategic goals, including total control of vast lands of the Northwest. Henry’s young 
protégée, George Rogers Clark, worked tirelessly to achieve the governor’s vision of Virginian 
hegemony over the Old Northwest. Clark acquired a reputation as a gallant and sometimes 
brutal Indian fighter and patriot. Many Native Americans feared the man who ordered or 
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performed the tomahawking of several Indians during the 1778 siege of Fort Sackville.138 Clark’s 
successful campaigns against the British and their Indian allies solidified Virginian, and 
eventually American, claims to the West.  
Virginia appointed Clark to head the state’s western war effort, but he received little 
tangible support from the state. Clark’s connections with Henry enabled him to advocate for the 
plight of western settlers. In 1776, Clark convinced Virginia’s executive council to supply the 
western theatre with five hundred pounds of gunpowder, but only after he gave a personal 
financial guarantee of its safety. Disgusted with Virginia’s lack of support for the West, Clark 
grumbled, “If a country is not worth protecting, it is not worth claiming.”139 Undaunted, Clark 
organized and occasionally “conscripted” volunteers to take the fight to the British posts north 
of the Ohio River.140 In 1778, he led a series of spectacular if small-scale victories, including the 
capture of the British agent Henry Hamilton, greatly reducing British influence in the region and 
securing Clark’s military reputation. Clark’s capture of Kaskaskia, Vincennes, and Sackville 
provided a much-needed morale boost to the American cause, and expedited America’s alliance 
with France. Clark’s victories also bolstered the credibility of Virginia’s claims over Ohio, Illinois, 
and Indiana. Nonetheless, Virginia never adequately compensated Clark or his men, aside from 
land grants in southern Indiana. Though substantial, these grants were located too far outside 
the bounds of white settlement to provide security or reasonable profit, and Clark died bitter 
toward Virginia. Still, his exploits left Virginia’s oligarchy with a legitimate claim to the 
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Northwest.141 His accomplishments promised Virginia’s speculators access to new lands for 
many decades to come. 
 Native Americans and the American Revolution  
Native Americans had diverse responses to the American Revolution that depended on 
their location, the course of the war, and which subgroup or village they belonged to. Historian 
Colin Calloway describes this diversity in The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and 
Diversity in Native American Communities (1995). For example, the Shawnee, the primary 
antagonists of Kentucky settlers, divided in their response to the Revolution because of the 
complex nature of their clan and kinship ties. Calloway argues that “the Shawnees… exemplify 
the inadequacy of standard portrayals of Indian experiences during the Revolution.”142 He notes, 
“The American Revolution in Shawnee country translated into a story of political fragmentation 
and burning villages” and highlights the tragic consequences of each choice facing the 
Shawnee.143  Joining the British or the Americans brought almost equal risk of violent reprisal, 
while those who remained neutral “Faced… the prospect of war despite their best efforts for 
peace.”144 During the Revolution, Indians in the Ohio Valley faced a multiplicity of options and 
pressures, and their choices defy neat categorizations. 
Though politically and socially fragmented, the Shawnee were ubiquitous during the 
Revolution in Kentucky. Calloway argues that the Shawnee had “a long tribal history of 
movement and dispossession on the cutting edge of the English frontier.”145 Constant friction 
with whites resulted in a Shawnee prominence in the historical record disproportionate to their 
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numbers. The Shawnee joined their Mingo, Delaware, and Miami allies in fighting the 
Americans. Yet at no point during the Revolutionary War did the entire Shawnee nation unite 
against backcountry settlers. Still, large factions among all the Ohio Indians prepared to go to 
war. In 1777, American settlers murdered Chief Cornstalk, the leading voice for peace among 
the Shawnee, reducing Native support for that option. Following Cornstalk’s death, Native 
Americans made countless small and a few large-scale incursions into Kentucky. Chief Blackfish’s 
unsuccessful 1778 campaign against Boonesborough represented the high point of Indian 
pressure on Kentucky settlements. However, the campaign in Kentucky also coincided with 
Clark’s successes in the Illinois Country. Any hope of prosecuting a long term campaign in 
Kentucky melted away as Clark took control of British outposts throughout the pays d’en haut.  
Clark never limited his campaigns to the reduction of British forts, but also attacked 
Native settlements. The Kentucky militia followed Clark’s example of total war. 146 Native 
Americans responded in kind. Historian Richard White accurately describes the western theatre 
of the Revolution as “A War of Villagers.”147 Clark, supplied with only a small number of 
professional soldiers, relied on a militia force nearly as fickle as the Indians who served the 
British. By the middle of the war, Native Americans across the Ohio Country depended almost 
entirely on the British in Detroit for food and supplies, as their crops and homes suffered the 
ravages of total war. The white occupation of Kentucky disrupted the Ohio Indians’ sources of 
food and income, and the loss of access to Kentucky’s game severely limited their hunting 
opportunities.  
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 The challenges of constant violence and economic collapse shaped Ohio Indians’ war 
effort. Even with substantial support from British bases throughout the pays d’en haut, the 
loose confederacy of Shawnee, Delaware, Mingo, and other nations struggled to bring the full 
weight of their numbers to bear against their American foes. The British attributed Indian 
military challenges to their fickleness. In 1781, General Frederick Haldimand bemoaned the 
inconsistency of his Indian allies writing, “There is no dependence upon even those Indians who 
are declared for our favor, and there are a number in that country our avowed enemies…. There 
has not been a single instance where the Indians have fulfilled their engagements but influenced 
by Caprice, a dream or a desire of protracting the war, to obtain presents, have dispersed and 
deserted the Troops.”148 Settlers and Indians resisted leaving their homes for protracted 
campaigns, both sides preferring raids followed by hasty retreats to their redoubts. By war’s 
end, Kentucky’s white population faced few Indian incursions, despite major Indian victories like 
Chief Joseph Brant’s 1781 defeat of Pennsylvania militia led by Archibald Lochry or the Battle of 
Blue Licks (1782). As security improved, tens of thousands of settlers poured into Kentucky, 
diminishing the likelihood of an Indian reconquest of their hunting grounds. As the odds turned 
against the Ohio Indians, the fight increasingly became about the containment rather than the 
expulsion of white settlers from the western slope of the Appalachians. 
South of Kentucky, the Cherokee faced similar difficulties. Like the Ohio Indians, the 
Revolution divided the Cherokee. They had experienced the depredations of total war in the 
1750-60s against both Virginia and South Carolina.149 Still, portions of the Cherokee nation 
participated in Lord Dunmore’s War, comprising a significant portion of the party that attacked 
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Boone on his first attempt to settle Kentucky in 1774.150 Other factions of Cherokee attempted 
to remain neutral, but warriors led by chief Dragging Canoe attacked white settlements 
throughout the South, including in Kentucky. After some short-lived success the Cherokee faced 
a terrible total war assault led by the North Carolina militia between 1776 and 1780. During the 
Revolutionary War, the Cherokee confronted far greater numbers of American militia, and 
enjoyed only intermittent support from the British. They suffered extensive damage to their 
settlements, including the complete destruction of the “Overhill Settlements” on the eastern 
slope of the Appalachians.  
Only the Chickasaw prevented white encroachment on their land. When George Rogers 
Clark established Fort Jefferson at the fork of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers in 1780 in the 
heart of Chickasaw territory, Chickasaw warriors surrounded and besieged it. With the fort’s 
occupants running short of supplies, Clark sent orders to abandon the exposed outpost. The 
settlers escaped into Spanish territory before eventually becoming the first American colonizers 
of Illinois.151 The Chickasaw’s success at Fort Jefferson was the only Indian victory with long-
term consequences in the war against white colonization of Kentucky. By 1780, Kentucky’s white 
population had grown too large for the Indians to remove.   
Legal Status 
 Throughout the Revolutionary era, Kentucky’s relationship to the mother state of 
Virginia remained ambiguous. After Revolution began, Virginia’s leaders focused more on the 
security and stability of the long settled portions of the state, where threat of British raids, 
invasion, and slave revolt remained constant. Frontier settlers thus received little attention from 
eastern leaders more concerned with securing their immediate surroundings. But if Kentucky 
                                                          
150
 Faragher, Boone, 52. 
151
 See Chinn, Kentucky: Settlement to Statehood, 229-34. 
 
 
56 
  
received only limited military aid, particularly during the first half of the Revolution, Virginia’s 
leaders often took an active role in governing the West. 
 Before the Revolution, the Crown’s Board of Trade had discussed the future of Virginia’s 
western territories, including a new western colony called Vandalia.152 Totaling nearly thirty 
million acres, Vandalia’s borders followed the southern bank of the Ohio, from western 
Pennsylvania down to the Kentucky River. Unlike the various land companies that lobbied to 
secure and sell land west of the Appalachians under the supervision of various eastern colonies, 
the proprietors of the Vandalia project, including Benjamin Franklin, went straight to the British 
parliament and the Crown’s Board of Trade. Various British leaders supported or became 
shareholders in the company known as the “Grand Ohio Company” or Walpole Company. 
Vandalia looked to become the fourteenth colony, before a few well-placed opponents of the 
project, including George Washington, conspired to delay final approval.153 The coming of the 
independence in 1776 destroyed any remaining prospects for a new western colony.154 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, who both claimed portions of Vandalia, would not allow the project 
to block their state’s access to the West. Though the proprietors of Vandalia continued to lobby 
the Continental Congress, the project died in 1776.  
 A bigger question loomed in 1776: the status of Richard Henderson’s Transylvania 
Colony. Henderson had privately and illegally negotiated the Sycamore Shoals Treaty with the 
Cherokee in 1775. The treaty essentially gave Henderson a deed to: 
all that tract, territory or parcel of land, situate lying and being in North America on the 
Ohio River, one of the eastern branches of the Mississippi beginning on the said Ohio 
River at the mouth of Kentucky, Chenoca, or what by the English is called Louisa River, 
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from thence running up the said River and the most northwardly branch of the same to 
the head spring thereof, thence a southeast course to the top ridge of Powel's 
Mountain, thence westwardly along the ridge of said mountain unto a point from which 
a northwest course will hit or strike the head spring of the most southwardly branch of 
Cumberland River thence down the said River including all its waters to the Ohio River, 
thence up the said River as it meanders to the beginning, &c.155 
 
Essentially, the treaty declared that all the lands between the Kentucky, Ohio, and Cumberland 
Rivers were Henderson’s private estate. Accordingly, Henderson planted all of the colony’s 
settlements south of the Kentucky River. Virginia’s and North Carolina’s royal governors issued 
proclamations declaring the sale invalid, but by late 1775, neither governor could dictate policy 
in the backcountry because of rapidly changing events in the colonies. Henderson, for his part, 
probably justified the treaty of Sycamore Shoals by pointing to the Shawnee concessions at 
Camp Charlotte and the 1757 Camden-Yorke opinion. 
However, the Revolution made British legal opinion and royal proclamations irrelevant. 
After 1776, Henderson’s claims to Kentucky faced the opposition of members of Virginia’s new 
state government, many of whom had invested in land speculation companies – especially the 
Ohio and Loyal Companies – that competed for the same territories. As Thomas Perkins 
Abernethy notes, Virginia leaders “Thomas Nelson and Richard Corbin belonged to the Loyal 
Company; Philip Ludwell Lee, John Tayloe and Robert Carter were members of the Ohio 
Company; while William Byrd, Ralph Wormely and John Page had been associated with Patrick 
Henry in his unsuccessful plan to buy [the same] lands from the Cherokee in the spring of 
1774.”156 The Transylvania Company deal copied the one that Henry and his associates had 
sought to broker in 1774. Yet, Henderson’s venture enjoyed only a brief season of support. 
George Rogers Clark, Arthur Campbell, and John Floyd all bought lands under Henderson’s 
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control, and Henry provided some support to Henderson’s claims at the Virginia Convention, 
leading some observers to believe that the two had reached an agreement. 157 Following his 
ascent to the governorship of Virginia, however, Henry lost any incentive to back Henderson’s 
claims because he could now set the terms of state policy in the West. At the same time, many 
of the Transylvania Colony’s settlers began lobbying Virginia for recognition, not as an 
independent western colony, but as a county of Virginia.158 In December 1776, Virginia 
reorganized its western territories creating three new counties – Montgomery, Washington, and 
Kentucky – from Fincastle County and the new Transylvania settlements. With Kentucky’s 
incorporation into Virginia, Henderson’s Transylvania Colony vanished, and the fate of his land 
claims left to the mercy of his competitors. 
Confused Loyalties 
Even as Virginia redefined the borders of the western territories, a wave of separatist 
movements began. Along with the proprietors of the major land companies, backcountry 
settlers actively lobbied state legislatures and the Continental Congress for support or 
recognition. A 1776 petition from settlers of Augusta County, Virginia, called for “a new 
Government” with “their own authority” and power to “send delegates to Congress to represent 
them as the fourteenth link in the American Chain.”159 Another larger attempt to establish a new 
state named Westsylvania in roughly the same area as the Vandalia Colony also circulated in 
1776.160 Similar petitions appeared in Kentucky on several occasions between 1775 and 1779. 
The desire for separation from the East and to control local land distribution along with local 
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politics contributed to the western state movement that simmered for the remainder of the 
Revolutionary War. 
The backcountry settlements thus suffered from an identity crisis prompted by the 
unclear terms of their relationship to both the new national government and Virginia. The state 
responded by requiring western settlers to take a oath of allegiance to the Old Dominion. The 
oath read in part, “I do swear or affirm that I renounce and refuse all allegiance to George the 
third, king of Great Britain, his heirs and successors, and that I will be faithful and bear true 
allegiance to the commonwealth of Virginia, as a free and independent state, and that I will not, 
at any time, do, or cause to be done, any matter or thing that will be prejudicial or injurious to 
the freedom and independence thereof, as declared by congress.”161 Virginia threatened to strip 
those who refused the oath of their citizenship and have their land and firearms confiscated. 
Through this policy Virginia hoped to maintain control in the restive back country. However, 
Virginia’s leaders lacked a comprehensive vision for the West from which they could develop a 
coherent policy. 
A Tale of Two Governors 
By the start of the American Revolution, some of Virginia’s elite families were in steep 
decline.162 A new generation of younger planters had begun to reshape Virginia’s leadership. 
Names like Washington, Jefferson, and Henry took their place alongside older families such as 
the Carters, Fairfaxes, and Byrds. These upstarts, hailing from Virginia’s Piedmont, formed the 
core of the Old Dominion’s Revolutionary leadership and soon dominated Virginia’s internal 
politics. Of this group, Henry and Jefferson played key roles in shaping Virginia’s relationship to 
Kentucky. 
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Contemporaries and historians often recognize Henry as a catalyst for independence in 
Virginia. His gift for fiery oratory was matched by a level of hubris that led him to abuse his 
political power on a scale that would have made Albert B. Fall – famed participant in the so 
called “Teapot Dome Scandal – blush. The bellicose politician saw no distinction between 
Virginia’s western land claims and his own personal fortunes. Indeed, Henry became involved in 
nearly every major private land acquisition scheme between 1760 and his death in 1799. He 
invested in Dr. Thomas Walker’s Loyal Company. He participated in the Illinois and Wabash Land 
Companies when acting as an advisor to Lord Dunmore. When Washington began buying the 
land bonuses of Seven Years War veterans, Henry received a significant portion of the two 
hundred thousand acres. In 1775, he attempted to negotiate an almost identical treaty to the 
one Richard Henderson extracted from the Cherokee at Sycamore Shoals. When he learned of 
Henderson’s success, Henry quickly allied himself to the Transylvania Company. Indeed, 
Henderson thanked him for his assistance in defending his claim in the Virginia legislature.163 
The Vandalia Colony also became one of Henry’s pet projects, even though other elite Virginians 
opposed the claims of its proprietors. Henry even issued a legal opinion in support of Vandalia’s 
land claims in Virginia territory. Vandalia proprietor Samuel Wharton reminded his brother 
Thomas that “half shares in the company be given to eight useful members of Congress… in 
addition to the share already set aside for Patrick Henry.”164 In short, Henry attached himself to 
most major speculative ventures in the colonies, but his support for these projects frequently 
changed depending on the direction of the political winds. When he became governor of 
Virginia in 1776, Henry presided over Virginia’s annexation of the claims of the Transylvania and 
Vandalia Companies. Additionally, Henry proceeded to press Virginia’s interests beyond 
Kentucky. His close association with George Rogers Clark promoted Virginia’s military 
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expeditions in the West, and served as a vehicle to improve each man’s financial fortunes. Every 
campaign that Clark undertook in the West also involved surveys and clandestine patents.165  
Henry’s speculations influenced the early years of the Revolution in the West. But by 
1777 his speculative activities had become so controversial that he felt compelled to file a sworn 
deposition stating that he had not participated in illegal activities.166 Henry left the governorship 
in 1778 after thoroughly enriching himself. Over the rest of his life, he remained involved in land 
speculation. Most famously, he invested in the highly corrupt Yazoo Land Company. In 1794, 
Henry and his associates bribed Georgia officials to sell them millions of acres in northern 
Georgia, and then attempted to pay for their portion in depreciated treasury bonds. When the 
state legislature rejected the sale, Henry faced legal exposure for fraud and financial ruin from 
the purchase of tens of thousands of dollars’ worth of depreciated debt certificates. However, 
Alexander Hamilton’s monetary policies nationalized Henry’s investments in Virginia debt 
certificates, thus saving his cash, profits, and reputation.167 Henry embodied the corrupt 
relationship between government and land speculation companies in late eighteenth century 
Virginia. The state’s leading men, many of them “Founding Fathers” and “patriots,” structured 
Virginia’s relationship with the West to increase their personal wealth and status. 
In contrast, Virginia’s second governor, Thomas Jefferson, viewed western lands 
differently than most of the state’s elite.  Though, like Henry, a lawyer by trade, Jefferson’s 
strengths were primarily intellectual. Through the written word, he articulated a vision for the 
western lands that incorporated America’s republican ideals. Jefferson took a keen interest in 
the historical and legal origins of the British system of land tenure. British common law held that 
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private property, in the modern sense, did not exist. The King held sway over all the soil of the 
British Empire, and anyone granted property rights by the Crown did so out of reciprocal 
obligation to the crown. Thus, individuals did not own but instead held land as a sort of 
revocable trust. This legal doctrine, a vestige of the feudal system, was applied haphazardly in 
the colonies, where different notions of land ownership continued to evolve. In Britain, where 
lands were finite, patronage and feudal obligation continued to follow patterns dating back to 
the Norman invasion. Applying these principles on the American continent proved difficult. 
Certain North American regions followed in the feudal traditions of England.  Pennsylvania and 
Virginia’s Northern Neck, for example, were proprietary estates granted by the Crown. 
However, the remainder of the colonies were owned by various chartered companies or directly 
by the crown.  The “waste and unappropriated lands” that these colonies claimed offered 
potential landownership to England’s landless classes.168 
During the years preceding the American Revolution, Jefferson embarked on a scholarly 
crusade to erode the legal and historical foundations of the Crown’s hegemony over colonial 
land and to establish allodial (private) property rights. Jefferson best articulated his ideas in A 
Summary View of the Rights of British America, published in 1774 and eventually disseminated 
across the colonies and Great Britain. He argued that British common law, the foundation of 
British jurisprudence and property rights, grew out of feudalism, and was imposed on England 
after the Norman Conquest. This “error in the nature of our land holdings” Jefferson argued, 
was foisted upon unwitting American agriculturalists who “were farmers, not lawyers.”169 He 
continued: 
While the crown continued to grant [lands] for small sums, and on reasonable rents; 
there was no inducement to arrest the error, and lay it open to public view. But his 
                                                          
168
 See Philbrick, Rise of the West, 104-33. 
169
 Thomas Jefferson, Summary View of Rights in British North America (1774), reprinted in Merrill D. 
Peterson, ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson (New York: Viking Press, 1975), 3-21. 
 
 
63 
  
majesty has lately taken on him to advance the terms of purchase, and of holding to the 
double of what they were; by which means the acquisition of lands being rendered 
difficult, the population of our country is likely to be checked.170 
 
Jefferson worried that the Crown’s control of land allowed for abuses of power and limited 
opportunities in the colonies. He made no mention that land companies and major proprietors 
also controlled land prices and monopolized land distribution.  
Jefferson challenged royal authority and advanced a vision for an American model of 
land ownership and private property rights: 
It is time, therefore, for us to lay this matter before his majesty, and to declare that he 
has no right to grant lands of himself. From the nature and purpose of civil institutions, 
all the lands within the limits which any particular society has circumscribed around 
itself are assumed by that society, and subject to their allotment only. This may be done 
by themselves, assembled collectively, or by their legislature, to whom they may have 
delegated sovereign authority; and if they are allotted in neither of these ways, each 
individual of the society may appropriate to himself such lands as he finds vacant, and 
occupancy will give him title.171 
 
Though arguing for a return to pre-Norman land ownership paradigm, Jefferson’s radical view of 
property ownership was, in fact, out of step with the ideas of many of his fellow aristocrats. 
Virginia’s elite benefitted from the system of land patents and tenure, which they used to enrich 
themselves. Indeed, the gentry had controlled the colony’s system of land distribution through 
the colony’s executive council and the House of Burgesses since the mid-seventeenth century.172 
During that period, Virginia’s elite either ran out or recruited every royal governor to their 
cause.173 Jefferson’s suggestions not only subverted royal supremacy, but also threatened the 
land distribution system that had for so long enriched many of Virginia’s leading men. 
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 In 1777, Jefferson chaired a legislative committee that included George Wythe, Edmund 
Pendleton, and George Mason tasked with reforming the entirety of Virginia’s laws.174 The 
committee’s extensive work continued into 1778, but it spent much of its time working on the 
subject of land, property rights, and the implementation of Jefferson’s vision for Virginia’s lands. 
Two of the six land laws passed in May 1779 reflected Jefferson’s republican paradigm. 
Elements of the legislation promised to encourage Jefferson’s vision of a politically empowered 
yeoman class, and create what historians now call “Jeffersonian democracy.”175 One month 
later, Jefferson became Virginia’s governor. Though his legacy as governor continues to center 
on his 1781“Flight from Monticello” to avoid capture by Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s band of 
British cavalry, his most profound legacy from these years lay in the West. The administration 
and implementation of the land laws of 1779 became a critical component shaping the course of 
western settlement. 
A Summary of the Factors Influencing the Passage of the Land Laws of 1779 
By 1780, George Rogers Clark’s victories in British-held territories dramatically improved 
security in Kentucky. Thousands of settlers had died in the struggle with British-allied Ohio 
Indians. Fayette County, one of three counties created from Kentucky County in 1780, suffered 
860 deaths at the hands of Indian raiders between 1780 and 1782.176 The Virginia government 
largely ignored the region during several periods of crisis. However, as security improved land 
ownership became the settlers’ primary concern. Land was, after all, the primary reason that 
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they risked all on the frontier in the first place. Settlers living on land in areas claimed by the 
now defunct Vandalia and Transylvania Colonies looked to Virginia to address the question of 
who would receive land and how it would be distributed. By early as 1776, five hundred sixty 
thousand acres of land divided into nine hundred claims had already been surveyed, during the 
Transylvania Company’s tenure.177 The question of what to do about Henderson, whose 
purchase from the Cherokee provided Virginia with the legal justification for the annexation of 
Kentucky, also remained uncertain. Those who had settled in Kentucky expected that Virginia 
would reward their sacrifices with traditional preemptions or “head rights.” Settlers believed 
that those who improved virgin land should receive a preemptive deed to the improved 
acreage. Here, the line between modern notions of “pioneers” and “squatters” blurred 
considerably, and the ubiquity of land jobbing made real claims almost indistinguishable from 
fraudulent ones. Virginia’s government followed a relatively lenient policy, even awarding 
Kentucky residents who settled prior to 1777 four hundred acres of land.178 However, the state 
had no way to determine which settlers’ claims were legitimate. Clark’s victories drew more 
settlers to Kentucky, and the problems compounded. Men like Boone, Arthur Campbell, and 
James Harrod, allies of Henderson’s, certainly expected more than four hundred acres for their 
efforts. Such concerns contributed to mounting dissatisfaction on the frontier. 
By 1778, the Virginia legislature faced a more pressing problem: solvency. The state was 
virtually bankrupt. Virginia printed copious amounts of paper money and struggled to sell 
bonds. The resulting inflation made already meager army salaries worthless. The state’s western 
lands offered its penniless government a potential source of revenue, as well as something more 
substantial than its paper currency to induce men to serve as soldiers. In addition, Virginia was 
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eager to assert its claims over its western lands in the face of continued competition from other 
colonies.179 As Thomas Perkins Abernathy argues, the Virginia government “wanted to obtain 
from the sale of lands funds with which to restore the credit of the State… to undermine the 
claims of non-Virginian speculators who were trying to get possession of the lands that Virginia 
claimed for herself… and to avoid further confusion by settling all outstanding claims to Western 
lands.”180 Desperate to raise and pay an effective army, the state had few other options. 
Kentucky quickly became the solution to many problems facing the state in a time of crisis. The 
land laws of 1779 addressed issues of land title and distribution, western security, soldier’s pay, 
and state solvency. Virginia’s government hoped that the laws would prove a legal panacea. 
The Best of Intensions: The Land Laws of 1779 
By passing the land laws in May 1779, the Virginia government essentially pressed the 
reset button on the frontier, and outlined the way in which Kentucky would be settled. The 
legislature passed six acts in the space of six months between May and October, the Military 
Provisioning Act, the First Land Law, the Second Land Law, the Military Warrant District Act, and 
the Military Bounty Act. Each of these laws affected the Kentucky settlements directly. Likewise, 
each sought to prevent disputes and problems on the frontier, albeit with limited success. 
The Virginia Volunteer Army Act contained one key passage related to Kentucky. Most 
of the law pertained to annual recruitment, organization, and provisioning of soldiers, but 
paragraph three stated: 
And for the defense and protection of the western frontiers against the Indian or other 
enemies, who may commit hostilities in that quarter, Be it enacted, That two battalions 
of the said volunteers be raised in the counties lying on that side the state…. The said 
battalions to be posted or garrisoned on the frontiers of this state, at such places as 
shall, from time to time, appear most convenient; the said battalions shall not be 
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compelled to march out of the commonwealth, unless in case of an expedition against 
the enemy Indians, or in pursuit of any enemy who shall have invaded the frontier.181 
This act was the first official attempt to secure the region from attack and to provide protection 
for settlers using regular soldiers. Though recent victories at Boonesborough and Clark’s Illinois 
campaign had strengthened security, Virginia recognized that it needed to do more to entice 
inhabitants back into the still dangerous region.  
After providing for Kentucky’s security, the legislature moved to solve the problem of 
veteran’s bounties. The Military Provisioning Act established the terms by which soldiers 
received a veteran’s bounty: 
At the end of the war every of the said soldiers, sailors, and marines, shall be entitled to 
a grant of one hundred acres of any unappropriated land within this commonwealth, 
and every of the officers commanding the said soldiers, sailors, or marines, shall be 
entitled to a grant of the like quantity of land as is allowed to officers of the same rank 
in the Virginia regiments on continental establishment, which they shall locate according 
to the directions of the laws, for which no purchase money shall be required on behalf 
of the commonwealth: Such of the said soldiers, sailors, or marines, as shall be disabled 
in the service, and the widows of those slain or dying therein, shall be entitled to 
immediate relief, and also to annual pensions as provided in one act of general 
assembly, passed at the last session entitled “An act for establishing a board of auditors 
for publick accounts.” 182 
The state increased the size of the grant if the veteran in question had served until the cessation 
of hostilities. These soldiers would receive land bounties according to their rank and length of 
service, as outlined in the Military Bounties Act. An enlisted man serving until the end of the war 
could expect to receive four hundred acres of land, captains were entitled to three thousand 
acres, while major generals topped the list with a maximum potential of 17,500 acres. 183  
In 1779, much of Kentucky’s land in the Bluegrass was already spoken for by either 
preemptive settlers or wealthy Virginia speculators. Though a soldier could attempt to claim 
land anywhere in the state, legislators found it prudent to set aside a region on territory not yet 
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encumbered by the litigious tug of war between speculators and squatters. A resolution in the 
second of the land act, placed the land reserved for veterans outside of the Bluegrass in an 
enormous tract south of the Green River, in southwestern Kentucky.184 The state officially closed 
this 4.2 million acre region to settlement, preemption, and speculation.185 Several more years 
passed before the state issued the first warrants, and the area remained almost completely 
unsettled until well into the 1790s, even as the rest of Kentucky swelled with immigrants. 
Virginia also possessed a military district in Ohio, but the laws required that the Green River 
tract be distributed before the state opened the Ohio areas for settlement.  
 Next, the legislature dealt with the preemptive claims of the settlers. The second law 
stipulated that settlers who could prove they had engaged in physical and bona fide settlement 
in Kentucky before January 1778 would receive preemptive deed allotments not to exceed 
fourteen hundred acres of land.186 Next, the state officially awarded preemptive rights to 
Kentucky’s pioneers, again totaling fourteen hundred acres per family.187 The act stipulated that 
the state would not grant preemptions to anyone who could not prove residence prior to the 
act’s passage. Richard Henderson received compensation for his troubles with a two hundred 
thousand acre tract south of the Green River.188 The laws created a land office “for the purpose 
of granting lands within this commonwealth,” and laid out the process by which the entirety of 
Kentucky would be sold off to raise money for Virginia’s depleted treasury.189 A final important 
provision stipulated that claims not made by the end of the assembly’s session, became null and 
void. A concurrent section of this bill, section (B), established three land offices to act as an 
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arbiters of disputes and undertake the necessary paperwork. 190 The laws clearly stated that the 
state would acknowledge no new preemptive claims, and that it would now distribute all land 
either through the military system or the land patent office. 
 In general, the land laws of 1779 sought to restore order to a chaotic and muddled 
situation on the frontier, encourage settlement in still vulnerable regions, and begin the 
important task of meeting compensation obligations to Virginia’s veterans. However, this 
genuine attempt at reform introduced some serious problems. The rest of this thesis will 
examine the effects, successes, failures, and legacies of Virginia’s ill-fated land system. 
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CHAPTER 3: A LEGACY 
A Legislative Legacy in the West 
 Virginia’s land laws of 1779 had a deep and lasting impact on many parties in the early 
republic. The state’s attempt to organize and distribute Kentucky’s lands impacted the state, 
frontier settlers, Native Americans, the nation, Kentucky’s ecology, and the land itself. Thomas 
Jefferson never fully realized his vision of large scale allodial land ownership in Kentucky through 
the 1779 land laws of, and they produced significant difficulties in the region.  Virginia’s new 
policies opened the floodgates to settlement in Virginia’s western territories, and transformed 
Kentucky from “backcountry” to “frontier.”191 Indeed, Kentucky’s settlement represents 
America’s reorientation from the East towards Europe to the West and expansion.  Additionally, 
the land laws provided the first legal framework to ensure that settlers on lands claimed by 
Virginia were no longer outlaws on Indian lands but citizens of the United States. These new 
legal protections propelled the American nation westward. The scale and legal framework of 
Kentucky’s transformation made it the archetype of western settlement and the laboratory for 
the ideals of the Revolutionary leadership. Kentucky’s settlement occurred during the narrow 
window between independence and the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, making it a key 
precedent setting event in the process of western settlement. 
1779: Immediate Effects of the Land Laws 
The first and perhaps most important effect of the land laws of 1779 was the dramatic 
rise in emigration to Kentucky. The Shawnee military campaigns of 1777-78 displaced most of 
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Kentucky’s earliest settlers, who abandoned partially or completely their improved land 
claims.192 The experience of the McAfee family illustrates the transient nature of Kentucky’s 
earliest settlers. The male McAfees, predating Boone and Harrod in Kentucky by several months, 
set about building cabins and clearing land in the Salt River region in the spring of 1775.193 After 
planting apple trees, they returned to Virginia to collect their families and belongings. In 1776, 
low water levels prevented them from traveling down the region’s rivers, and delayed their 
return to Kentucky. After provisioning several cabins along their planned route, they went back 
to Virginia to wait until the following year. When they returned, they found their cabins 
destroyed in the fighting and postponed settlement further. The McAfees traveled west again to 
Kentucky in 1779 when they discovered that they might lose their land if they could not prove 
permanent residence. They hastily carried their families overland through the Cumberland Gap 
to their original claim on the Salt River, where they found their four-year-old apple trees bearing 
fruit.194  
Improved security in the wake of George Rogers Clark’s campaigns and the 
establishment of a clear land distribution policy encouraged many of Kentucky’s first settlers to 
follow the McAfees’ course. Likewise, thousands of new settlers rushed to Kentucky in the hope 
of securing land patents. The tide of settlers that poured into the region pushed the population 
from a few hundred in 1778 to over twenty thousand by the end of 1780.195 The Wilderness 
Road traffic across the Cumberland Gap was supplemented by large numbers of settlers 
traveling by barge down the Ohio River to landing sites like Limestone and the Falls of the Ohio. 
By the end of the 1780s, Kentucky’s population had ballooned to seventy three thousand, 
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despite continued conflict with the Indians.196 Few of the new arrivals were veterans. Though 
the land laws stipulated that preemptions and military grants took precedent in land disputes, 
the state did not even start to issue warrants until 1781. By then, settlers had already claimed 
the best land in the Bluegrass multiple times over. Both the military and civilian land grant 
systems created problems that took decades to solve. 
Problems with Preemptions 
Problems with the land laws became evident as early as the fall of 1779. Settlers old and 
new compiled a long list of complaints Early pioneers had the opportunity to secure between 
four hundred and fourteen hundred acres depending on their time of settlement.197 However, 
new arrivals found the system fraught with confusion and graft. The deadlines, though extended 
multiple times, created a rush on the land office. When it opened on May 1, 1779, the director, 
John May, was immediately forced to shut down again to work on a backlog of 1.6 million acres 
of claims.198 The office did not reopen for almost three weeks.  
The preemptive rights afforded to permanent settlers in Kentucky initially seemed 
generous, but also encouraged abuses. The land laws required that those seeking warrants 
provide proof of residence prior to January 1, 1778, and that “surveys and rights be returned to 
the said office within twelve months next after the end of this present session of assembly, 
otherwise they shall be, and are hereby declared forfeited and void.”199 The narrow timelines 
and difficulty of confirming or denying residence discouraged honest citizens. So-called “land 
jobbers” and “outliners” sought to take advantage of the preemptive rights system by surveying 
and improving as much land as they could. Land jobbers erected cabins on unclaimed land and 
then submitted claims under false names to skirt the legal limits of the laws. Outliners built 
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cabins and planted crops, and then sold their preemptions to the newest immigrant seeking to 
get in line. Both land jobbers and outliners often worked on behalf of wealthy patrons back 
east.200 Though residents maligned the practice, some joined in the frenzy. Many settlers, 
present in the region when Boonesborough and Harrodsburg were established, had also 
surveyed and improved acreage well in excess of what the laws allowed, and now stood to lose 
these claims. In all, 65 percent of those making claims in Kentucky during this period had 
multiple entries in the books, though the number of fraudulent preemptions, patented under 
false aliases can never be known.201 Still, the chaotic race to survey the Bluegrass, and beat 
one’s competitors to the front of the line resulted in a patchwork of overlapping parcels. Maps 
of early Kentucky surveys display land claims that sometimes overlapped in excess of three and 
four times.202 
To settle these disputed claims, the land laws established four civil appeals courts in 
Kentucky, presided over by four commissioners tasked with arbitrating and deciding these 
cases.203 These temporary courts were originally chartered to last through early 1780, but the 
Virginia legislature extended the courts mandate through April of the following year.204 
Commissioners took an oath of service that read, in part: 
I will do equal right to all manner of people, without respect of persons; I will not take  
by myself, nor by any other person, any gift, fee, or reward for any matter done, or to  
be done by virtue of my office, except such fees or salary as the law shall allow me; and  
finally in all things belonging to my said office, I will faithfully, justly, and truly, according  
to the best of my skill and judgment, do equal and impartial justice, without fraud,  
favor, affection, or partiality.205  
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Despite the oath, the commissioners abused their office. John May, director of the warrant 
office in Louisville, complained about the corruption of these commissioners: “I find that the 
Commisisoners… have granted certificates for Settlements & PreEmptions for all the prime Land 
in this Country some of them having entered largely into the Land Business by purchasing Claims 
& then sitting in Judgment upon them: and granting Certificates to themselves; and in order to 
procure Land having admitted hundreds of Claims entirely out of the Letter & meaning of the 
Law.”206 In 1780, frustration boiled over among the many settlers unable to find available land in 
the region. Prices continued to soar, as demand and inflation pushed prices from twenty pounds 
sterling per one-hundred acres, to one hundred sixty pounds. In an act of angry desperation, a 
mob burned the commission’s records.207 Neither the laws nor the courts offered an immediate 
solution, and legal battles over Kentucky’s first claims dragged on for generations. 
Problems with the Warrant Office 
John May’s accusations of fraud in the land courts smacked of hypocrisy. From his desk 
at the patent office, he and his associates amassed hundreds of thousands of acres and presided 
over some of the most disastrous aspects of Kentucky’s land sales. That state charged May’s 
office with issuing new warrants for surveys and patents for lands. The system was simple in 
theory, but in practice, the patent system proved the weakest point of the land laws of 1779.  
Virginia-issued land warrants did not specify a specific location for the acreage in 
question.208 The recipient of the warrant was expected to find unclaimed land, survey it, and 
then submit a request for a patent to that land. The warrant, paid for in advance, merely gave its 
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holder the opportunity to select lands from those not already claimed. Thus, one could own a 
warrant for one thousand acres of land and not hold any deeds. Ownership became official 
when the warrant holder exchanged it for land patents. Since the state sold all land, regardless 
of quality, on a first come – first serve basis, it was in the interest of citizens, speculators, and 
land companies to secure the best lands immediately. The structure of the system had 
important implications. First, the patent system offered wealthy Americans the opportunity to 
turn their rapidly depreciating Continental or state-issued currency into tangible assets in a 
market with high demand. Within a few years, wealthy speculators from all over the country 
had secured land holdings in Kentucky larger than some New England states. Speculators from 
outside of Virginia amassed some of the largest estates.  Pennsylvanian Robert Morris and 
Alexander Wallcot of New England, for example, gobbled up one and a half million acres and 
one million acres, respectively.209 Another twenty-one individuals or companies acquired estates 
of at least one hundred thousand acres from the patent office.210 Dozens of others secured 
holdings in the tens of thousands.211 As a result, much of the land in Kentucky was secured by 
men who in many cases would never set foot in the region. These massive estates offered a 
hedge to wealthy easterners whose net worth declined precipitously as Continental and state 
currencies plummeted in value. Extreme currency depreciation enabled speculators to purchase 
land valued at forty dollars per one hundred acres for as little as fifty cents.212  
Lack of oversight allowed men like John May, first director of the land office, and Samuel 
Buell, May’s associate, to amass holdings of seven hundred fifty thousand acres.213 Many names 
appearing in the Kentucky Land Grants appear to be pseudonyms for those who wished to hide 
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their true identities. Thomas Shore, Kennon Jones, and Christopher McConnico, unknowns who 
appear nowhere else in the historical record, each received over four hundred thousand acres in 
patents.214 The names of well-known Virginians such as George Mason, George Lewis, John 
Banister, Patrick Henry, Thomas and Humphrey Marshall, and the Hite the Meriwether families 
appear as well. They all received between fifty and two hundred thousand acres of Kentucky 
land. None of these men chose to settle in Kentucky. In the end, patents accumulated by this 
short list of speculators and pseudonyms above totaled roughly 6.5 million acres of land, nearly 
a quarter of Kentucky’s landmass. As historian Daniel Friedenburg concludes, “the entire 
political structure of the United States, from the lower levels of state legislators and the 
governors to the U.S. legislature and then the Supreme Court and the presidency, was fueled for 
many decades thereafter by money made in this land speculation.”215 Virginia’s leading men, 
many of whom went on to leadership roles in the new federal government, grew wealthy by 
speculating in Kentucky lands and exploiting the land patent system. Jefferson’s attempt to 
expand the yeomanry through the sale of Kentucky’s lands instead became a hedge fund for the 
wealthy. 
In addition, the chaos of the system produced numerous disputed claims. When the 
courts became involved, the wealthy usually gained the upper hand. Celebrity and experience 
offered no advantage in the courts, as Daniel Boone discovered. He owned warrants worth 
thousands of acres as a result of both military bounties and preemptions, but came out of 
Kentucky’s courts with no land to his name. He later left the state in disgrace and disgust.216 By 
1800, the top 10 percent of Kentucky tax payers owned almost a third of the state, even after 
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generous distributions of lands to squatters in the mid-1790s.217 The conflict between the 
landed and landless classes in Kentucky continued for generations. On occasion, the 
discontented continued the practice of torching government buildings to destroy the paperwork 
associated with contentious legal proceedings.218 Disputes of boundaries and deeds continued 
until the Civil War. The chaotic nature of the land distribution system in Kentucky was summed 
up perfectly by the visiting Rev. David Rice, when he accurately predicted that the “spirit of 
speculation was flowing in such a torrent that it would wear down every weak obstacle that 
stood in its way. I looked forward to fifty or sixty years and saw the inhabitants engaged in very 
expensive and demoralizing litigations about their landed property.”219  
The Failure of the Military Component of the Land Laws 
 Kentucky residents remembered the land laws of 1779 for the chaotic situation they 
produced in the state’s civil court system. Equally significant, the laws failed to reward 
Revolutionary War veterans, one of the primary reasons for their passage. The state created the 
Green River Military District to entice and retain recruits to Virginia’s state line. How many 
soldiers enlisted to obtain land is unknown. However, the fate of these lands reveals that few 
veterans emigrated to the district.  
The Green River Military District failed, in part, for ecological reasons. Though the region 
contained a large area of virgin land, several factors converged to slow settlement. The first 
problem was one of perception. The earliest explorers of the Kentucky christened the Green 
River Country the “barrens” because they believed its treeless landscape meant poor soil 
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quality. For generations, colonists raised in the forested east coast, assessed the quality of land 
based on the types and diversity of tree species it supported. 220 The Bluegrass contained a mix 
of meadows and forests, while the barrens consisted almost entirely of grassland.221 Moreover, 
plowing prairie soil was difficult, as the dense root networks of the prairie grasses posed a far 
more serious challenge to eighteenth century plows than the soft soils of the eastern 
woodlands. Thus, the district’s reputation did not encourage veterans offered land to settle 
there. One explorer described the area as, “So sterile and inhospitable that neither man nor 
beast can live there.”222 Settlement was slow, and did not begin in earnest until nearly ten years 
after the state issued the first warrants. 
Second, the Green River Military District was isolated, south of the Falls of the Ohio, and 
rather dangerous. Virginia opened the region for settlement in 1782, the same year as the 
painful Battle of Blue Licks. 223 Consequently, few veterans ventured from Virginia to what was 
still a hostile frontier. Most of the surveying, awarding, and granting took place without the 
presence of the grantee.224 In addition, Virginia officers preferred military grants in the 
Bluegrass. Thus, though many officers may have claimed lands in the Green River region, few 
actually moved there, choosing to settle in the safer and more prosperous region around 
Lexington.225 Lower-ranking soldiers seem to have preferred to sell off what land they received 
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in exchange for cash.226 Speculators were happy to oblige them. John May and Samuel Buell, 
operators of the patent office, carried on a lively trade in grants and warrants and amassed 
holdings all over the state, including the Military District.227 Neither of these men served in the 
Revolution, but each still held large sections of the district reserved for the veterans. 
 The military warrant system also failed in part because Virginia distributed the land 
unequally. Essentially, the system operated on a first come, first-serve basis, and as a result the 
distribution of the Green River District mirrored the larger land crisis in Kentucky. Common 
soldiers lacked the means to seek out good lands, while wealthy officers possessed the money 
and incentive to pursue their claims. The system fundamentally favored the rich, as the disparity 
between the acreages awarded enlisted men and officers reveals. The huge disparity in the size 
of bounties between enlisted men and officers further discouraged large scale migration.  
The majority of Green River Military District lands were patented between 1782 and 
1787. Virginia opened another military bounty tract in Ohio for survey and settlement in 1787 
and 1794 respectively. The 4.2 million acre reservation for Virginia’s veterans had been 
preserved out of the state’s cession of its land claims in Ohio.228 Yet the Green River district 
remained almost devoid of Virginia veterans, and The Master Index of Virginia Surveys and 
Grants reveals that a few individuals engrossed much of the land.229 Veterans continued to sell 
off their Green River land grants for many years. Papers across the region and the country were 
filled with advertisements for Green River tracts well into the 1790s. For example, George Muter 
advertised in the April 25, 1795 issue of the Kentucky Gazette, “FOR SALE: Two Tracts of LAND, 
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Part of my Military right, one containing 1000 acres, lying on the Green river, about five miles 
above the mouth of Big Barren: the other containing 1500 acres, lying on Boyd’s creek, a branch 
of Big Barren.”230 Though Virginia issued 4,748 military warrants in Kentucky, few veterans 
settled there. 
Rather than a military community, the Green River district became a realm of absentee 
owners. Such absenteeism made it a squatter’s paradise. Those arriving in Limestone and 
Louisville in the late 1780s found few opportunities. Squatting could not result in “preemptive 
rights” to Bluegrass land, much of it claimed two or three times over. These landless immigrants 
soon moved south to the only region where they had a chance to live free of rent. The surprising 
quality and availability of the prairie land, intended as a veterans’ settlement, offered a haven 
for the indigent. In 1795, eight of every ten families in Logan County, the heart of the Barrens, 
were landless.231 An increasing number of families migrated south to the relatively empty 
region. These “Southside” squatters soon petitioned the new state government of Kentucky for 
the same preemptive rights extended to earlier settlers under the Virginia land laws of 1779.232 
In response, Kentucky granted preemptive rights to the landless population of the state in 1795, 
offering perhaps the only populist land distribution in line with Jefferson’s vision for Kentucky.233 
The law stipulated that squatting would be illegal following its passage, but the legislature 
granted preemptions in 1797 and again in 1800.234 By this time, the number of southsiders had 
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risen to nearly thirty thousand, or one sixth of Kentucky’s total population.235 Thus, the Green 
River never became a military reserve, but rather a squatter’s paradise.  
Other issues further reduced the effectiveness of Virginia’s land system. Requests for 
warrants continued well into the mid-1800s, long after many Revolutionary War veterans had 
died. The children, grandchildren, and next of kin entitled to benefits upon the death of their 
father or husband filed for warrants for men who never sought their claims.236 Many soldiers 
missed out on the warrant system because paperwork was easily lost in the turbulent years of 
the Revolution. Some soldiers never had any paperwork to begin with or simply never chose to 
file. Eventually, Virginia’s Revolutionary War records were moved to Washington.237 To 
complicate matters further, many of these records were lost in two fires in the city in 1800 and 
1814, the latter occurring when the British burned the Capitol during the War of 1812.238 A 
volume compiled by a William Hopkins includes hundreds of affidavits in which individuals did 
not receive their warrants due to inadequate paperwork or perceived fraud. In most of these 
cases, next of kin with little documentation tried to claim the benefits of deceased soldiers, with 
some cases dragging on into the 1850s.239  
When the Ohio Military District was opened to survey and settlement in the 1790s, the 
lands of Kentucky’s Military District, now almost entirely patented, contained only a handful of 
soldiers.240 In total, Virginia issued 4,748 military warrants for land in the Kentucky Military 
District, mostly to officers or second hand purchasers.241 The failure of the military component 
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of the land laws shaped the national approach to land distribution in the Northwest Territory. 
The land system also presented more immediate problems for the residents of Kentucky. 
Petitions and Independence 
Though Virginia’s land laws of 1779 certainly brought settlers to Kentucky, the system 
had serious problems. The primary concern of new residents was security, but such issues 
overlapped with their economic interests. Large absentee land claims throughout the region 
created impediments to new settlements, restricted settlers’ access to land, and threatened the 
security of those settlements already in place. Speculator holdings fragmented the frontier 
settlements and opening up corridors for Indian attack. As early as 1779, frontiersmen from 
Harrodsburg petitioned the Virginia legislature for redress: 
We are surrounded by numerous savage nations, Disjoined from every other settlement 
in the United States, and amounting to only fifteen hundred men here a tract of Country 
of five Million acres of tillable Land nearly secured under rights from Virginia to defend 
for those whom ease and Cowardice prevent settling.242 
Indeed, the frontier was a brutal and violent place, and common settlers most at risk. When 
Virginia failed to respond, Kentuckians took matters into their own hands, and sought the 
Continental Congress’s approval for the right of self-determination and statehood. 
 In May 1780, citing “grievances too heavy to be born,” six hundred forty of Kentucky’s 
leading men signed a petition calling for Congress to create a new state out Kentucky County 
and various other of Virginia’s western holdings . The signatories cited multiple concerns, chief 
among them the damaging effects of the new land laws on security: 
We your petitioners being situate in a wide Extencive Uncoltivated Country and Exposed 
on every side to incursions of the Savage Indians humbly Concieve Ourselves approssed 
by several acts of the general assembly of Virginia for granting large Grants for waist and 
unapropriated lands on the Western Waters without Reservation for Cultivating and 
Settling the same whereby Settling the contry is discouraged and the inhabitant are 
greatly exposed to the Saviges by whome our wives and Childring are daly Cruily 
murdered Notwithstanding our most Humble Petitions Canot Obtain Redress…. Take 
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Proper Methods to form us into a Separate State or grant us Such Rules and regulations 
as they in their Wisdoms shall think most Proper, during the Continuance of the Present 
War.243 
 
The petitioners also noted the great distance and detachment between Kentucky and Virginia’s 
government, making a convincing argument for regional autonomy. A few months later, three 
hundred forty Kentuckians signed an even more provocative petition addressed to Congress 
sarcastically suggested that the Kentuckians might move across the Ohio and live with the 
Indians if Congress did not address the issue of autonomy.244  
Some settlers even threatened to break away and join with Spain if their demands were 
not met. Kentucky’s economic viability depended on trade down the Spanish controlled 
Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans. While supportive of the American Revolution, 
Spain also saw the new nation as a threat to its sparsely populated North American territories. 
Spanish efforts to contain the spread of American settlers gave rise to one of Revolutionary 
America’s strangest stories of espionage. General James Wilkinson arrived in Louisville in 1784, 
immediately joining in the frenzy of land speculation. Wilkinson also found the time to destroy 
George Rogers Clark’s career, work multiple deals with the Spanish governor of Louisiana to 
promote Spanish interests in the American West, and even campaigned for Kentucky’s secession 
to Spain.245 Few western settlers seriously considered talk of joining the Spanish as anything 
more than propaganda designed to pressure the federal government to act in favor of 
statehood. However, Wilkinson’s role as an American-Spanish double agent demonstrates that 
ties with Spain sometimes ran deeper than even the petitioners knew. 246 
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The Land Laws and Statehood 
Virginia made attempts to respond to the complaints of Kentucky’s restless population, 
and amended the land laws many times. A law passed in May 1783 granted extensions to those 
filling preemption claims, nearly four years after the land office was established.247 After the 
law’s brief expiration in 1785, the legislature reinstated it 1786 and then extended it through 
1787.248 Despite these reforms, squatting continued on private and military district lands. The 
extension of the land commission, multiple preemption allowances, and eventual military 
assistance did little to quell the underlying dissatisfaction sparked by the land laws because 
Virginia’s leaders failed to acknowledge the fraud plaguing the land office system. 249 Ultimately, 
the land laws of 1779 laid the groundwork for Kentucky’s separation from Virginia. Kentucky’s 
population growth coincided with renewed interest in the establishment of western states. 
Jefferson toyed with the idea of Kentucky statehood as early as 1781-82, when he remarked in 
his Notes of the State of Virginia that the state might be “bounded, at some future day, by the 
meridian of the mouth of the Great Kanhaway.”250 
During and after the Revolution, questions arose about the future of the western lands. 
The conflicting claims of Virginia and other states delayed the adoption of the Articles of 
Confederation for four years. The articles passed Congress in 1777, but many northern states, 
seeking a partition of Virginia’s western claims, would not sign them until Virginia agreed in 
1781 to surrender all of its claims north of the Ohio River.251 By sacrificing the Ohio territories, 
Virginia lost little because the British and Indians still controlled these lands. However, Virginia’s 
leaders had no wish to relinquish Kentucky, despite increasing tension between the government 
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and the frontier settlers over land distribution and security. Complicating matters, the Spanish 
denied trans-Appalachian settlers the use of the Mississippi River, greatly reducing Kentucky’s 
export potential, and dragging down the fortunes of both Kentucky’s settlers and Virginia’s land 
speculators. 252 In addition, Kentuckians could not attack Indians across the Ohio River without 
Virginia’s consent. These issues, combined with the distance between the state capital and the 
western lands, forced the Virginia legislature to acknowledge that the Old Dominion should 
relinquish its claim to sole proprietorship over the area.253  
By 1785, Kentuckians clamored for independence. A convention held at Danville, 
Kentucky, in August 1785 petitioned Virginia to make Kentucky a “free, sovereign, and 
independent republic.”254 The delegates invoked many of the ideals of the American Revolution 
in their claims for statehood, but their primary grievances revolved around the land laws of 
1779. These laws had led to widespread litigation over competing claims, while Kentucky’s legal 
system, according to the petitioners, “subjects the inhabitants to expensive and ruinous suits in 
the High Court of Appeals, and places the unfortunate poor, the men of mediocrity, complete in 
the power of the opulent.”255 One of the convention’s resolutions displayed both the general 
discontent with the fundamental principles of the land system, and the currency of the ideals of 
Jefferson republicanism:  
It is subversive to the fundamental Principles of a free republican Government to allow 
any individual, or Company or Body of Men to possess such large tracts of Country in 
their own right as may at a future day give them an undue influence, and because it 
opens a door to speculation by which innumerable evils may ensue to the less opolent 
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part of the Inhabitants and therefor ought not to be done in the future disposal of lands 
in this District. 256  
 
The populist theme of the Danville convention underscored settlers’ abhorrence of speculation 
and absenteeism, given voice in the language of Jefferson’s republican vision of the West.  
The Virginia Assembly responded to the pressure in October, passing “An act concerning 
the erection of the district of Kentucky, into an independent state.” However, several of the 
act’s articles betrayed the economic interests of Virginia’s leading men in Kentucky. The law 
required that as a condition for statehood all absentee lands be protected under the land laws 
of 1779: “That all private rights and interests in lands within the said district, derived from the 
laws of Virginia, prior to such separation, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the 
proposed state, and shall be determined by the laws now existing in this state.” To protect 
absentee land holders from punitive taxations, the laws required that, “lands within the 
proposed state… shall not be… taxed higher than the lands of residents at any time prior to the 
admission of the proposed state… in congress.” Finally, to protect the integrity of the patents 
themselves, the law stipulated that “no grant of land, nor land warrant to be issued by the 
proposed state, shall interfere with any warrant heretofore issued from the land-office of 
Virginia, which shall be located on land within the said district now liable thereto, on or before 
the first day of September, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight.”257 The “opulent” 
men who so frustrated Kentucky’s settlers included protection as their own claims of the price 
for independence. The path to statehood dragged on for another seven years, but the legacy of 
the land laws could not be undone. These protections, built into the agreement for statehood, 
ensured that Kentucky’s new government would not invalidate the claims of absentee 
speculators. 
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Despite all the concerns over the legalities of land ownership, hostile Indians, the rigors 
of travel, and economic problems in the Mississippi watershed, Kentucky’s population ballooned 
from a few hundred in 1777, to seventy three thousand by the time of the national census of 
1790. At the turn of the century, the new state of Kentucky had over two hundred thousand 
residents, a majority of whom were not Virginians.258 Populist pressures demanded 
redistribution of land. Squatters ignored the legal system and did as they pleased. The 
stipulations placed on Kentucky’s statehood allowed little chance of redress for those who 
pursued land ownership through the established legal process. Quietly, settlers began to leave 
Kentucky for lands less burdened by litigation. Many of Kentucky’s earliest settlers lost all of 
their claims in the new state, and even as Kentucky’s population continued to grow, thousands 
moved on to seek their fortunes across the Ohio River, Daniel Boone among them.259 At times 
Kentucky threatened to explode into violence, as in Pennsylvania in 1791, but the Indian lands of 
the West absorbed Kentucky’s discontented settlers instead. As historian Stephen Aron writes, 
“The effects of outmigration were invisible; they were apparent only in what did not happen. 
Yet if thousands of pioneers had not moved on, Kentucky’s colonization would have been even 
more chaotic and probably less peaceful.”260  
Jefferson and His Land Laws 
The land laws of 1779 failed to meet Jefferson’s republican ideals. Despite his intention 
to transform Virginia’s relationship to land ownership, the outcome fell short of his goals. 
Jefferson had proposed radical ideas such as handing out free land to any “person of full age” in 
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order to broaden democracy.261 Rather than promoting the political and economic 
enfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of lower and middle class Virginians, the land laws 
instead allowed speculators both large and small to profiteer under a legal framework that 
favored absenteeism and squatting. Potential yeoman found their land claims tied up in court 
for decades. Most Virginians supported Jefferson’s populist approach, especially in light of the 
unpopular and corrupt practices of the land companies and more conservative politicians like 
Patrick Henry.262 The process of land distribution revealed that although new faces dominated 
Virginia’s government elites still monopolized political control. In many ways, the Revolution 
changed little about Virginia political and economic life. Despite the popularity of republican 
ideals in the West, when Kentucky became a state in 1792 roughly two-thirds of adult white 
males owned no land.263 Historian Thomas Perkins Abernathy concludes, “There is an element of 
historical irony that Jefferson, the father of democracy, should have helped to draft an act by 
which democracy was defeated in Virginia at the moment when it might have had its birth.”264 
Jefferson’s vision of a large and politically enfranchised yeomanry was usurped by Virginia’s well 
entrenched economic and political interests. As Abernethy concludes, “Thus the growth of the 
country was retarded, the resident population forced to protect the property of those who took 
no part in its defense, and the great public domain was exploited by a few individuals for their 
private gain.”265 Jefferson could not singlehandedly reshape the government of Virginia, and 
land laws it passed poorly reflected his own views. In 1776, Jefferson predicted that “selling 
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lands to [western settlers]… will disgust them, and cause an avulsion of them to the common 
union. They will settle the lands in spite of everybody.”266 His prophecy proved largely accurate. 
The Legacy of Virginia’s Policies on Other States and the Northwest Ordinances in Ohio 
 Jefferson had another opportunity to shape land ownership and distribution in the 
West, this time at the national level, and in the light of another failure of Virginia law. The 4.2 
million acre Virginia Military District in southeastern Ohio was officially opened for patent in the 
early 1790s. Land distribution in this veterans’ plat followed a nearly identical pattern of graft 
and abuse as in the Green River District of Kentucky. The United States Army suffered several 
important defeats in the Northwest Indian War in the early 1790s, limiting white encroachment 
into Ohio. The Virginia District lay near the site of General Arthur St. Clair’s disastrous defeat on 
the Wabash River in 1791 during which Shawnee and Delaware warriors decimated a one 
thousand strong U.S. army detachment.267 In response, Revolutionary War veterans sold off 
their land warrants in the Ohio Country for a pittance as they had done on the Green River. In 
the end, “A total of 2,095,220 acres were patented in the U.S. Military district, 70 percent of it 
by approximately one hundred men.”268 The Virginia system produced similar results in both the 
Green River and Ohio Districts. In both cases, wealthy men, typically Virginian, used the system 
to enrich themselves.269 
The Northwest Land Ordinances of 1785-87 clearly reflected Virginia’s experiences with 
the land laws of 1779 in Kentucky and Ohio. Following the passage of the Articles of 
Confederation, most leaders recognized that new states would need to be created in the 
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western territories. Three imminent Virginians – Washington, Jefferson, and James Monroe – 
represented three different philosophical approaches to the issue.270 Jefferson, who had signed 
the disastrous land laws of 1779, promoted quick statehood as the regions filled with people. 
More important, Jefferson viewed the western territories as an engine for democracy that 
would provide the nation with a self-sufficient yeomanry. By dividing the vast Northwest into 
subdivided grids sold at a set price and with predetermined deeds, Jefferson hoped to avoid the 
pitfalls that characterized Virginia’s experience in Kentucky.271 Washington, on the other hand, 
distrusted the western settlers and their fickle loyalty, and sought stringent requirements for 
new states to enter the union. Monroe adopted a compromise between Jefferson and 
Washington, raising the bar for statehood but including Jefferson’s vision of allodial land 
ownership and an expanded yeoman class. Indeed, Jefferson’s transformation of western land 
distribution through the Northwest Ordinance sowed the seeds of what some historians have 
called a “Jeffersonian Revolution.”272 Jefferson’s policies enjoyed broad support among the 
thousands of settlers who migrated west to settle new lands and pressed for preemptive rights 
despite continued speculative activity.273 Indeed, Northwest Territories experienced the same 
culture of speculation found in Kentucky, and the same desire to raise public funds that had 
motivated Virginia to sell Kentucky now motivated the national government to sell speculative 
companies rather than to individuals.274 However, Jefferson’s “Rectangular Survey System” of 
land distribution brought improvements over the disasters of the Virginia system.275 
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Likewise, Virginia’s military warrant system offered lessons to other states embarking on 
similar programs. The state of New York undertook a program of land grants in the late 1780s 
and early 1790s modeled after Jefferson’s Northwest Ordinances rather than the Virginia land 
laws of 1779. In New York, a private and non-commissioned officer could expect a generous 
grant of five hundred acres, while the state capped compensation for a major general at fifty 
five hundred acres.276 In addition, Virginia’s first come first-serve model was replaced with a 
more equitable lottery system, in which the state matched randomly drawn names and deeds 
which were surveyed and marked prior to distribution. Veterans knew exactly what land they 
were getting as soon as they received their deed, and could thus make educated guesses about 
their property’s market value. Virginia veterans did not enjoy this luxury, and many sold their 
land for pennies on the dollar, without ever knowing what they had.277 While not all states 
followed Jefferson’s approach, New York’s program of land distribution represented the best 
example of an equitable system of land distribution devised along the Jeffersonian model. 
Native Americans 
Native Americans were also deeply affected by the land laws and the partitioning of 
Kentucky. More than George Rogers Clark’s victories in Illinois, the large numbers of settlers 
moving west after 1778 forever ended the possibility of a Native American reconquest of 
Kentucky. The Shawnee and their allies changed their strategy from ejecting settlers from 
Kentucky, to preventing settlement north of the Ohio River. Before 1779, the outcome in the 
West remained in doubt; after 1779, Kentucky’s population grew exponentially. Western 
settlers’ anti-Indian sentiments also increased as violence continued. As frontiersman Major 
William Croghan wrote: “The country beyond the Alleghenies talks of nothing but killing Indians 
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and taking possession of their lands.”278 The notorious Gnadenhutten Massacre of 1782 – in 
which Pennsylvania militia slaughtered ninety-six unarmed Lenape converts living at the 
Moravian mission – further emphasized the fact that many whites sought to exterminate the 
Indians.279 Constant aggression and settlement pushed the Ohio Indians further into alliance 
with the British. 
When the British surrendered the Northwest Territory in the Treaty of Paris (1783), the 
Indians faced an uncertain fate. Still, they continued to resist white encroachment, enjoying 
several major victories and intermittent British support until 1815. However, the federal 
government directed its attention more fully to the West after 1783, making plans for the 
partition of lands north of the Ohio still under Native American control. Jefferson’s Northwest 
Ordinances of 1785-1787, the same laws that sought to ensure the propagation of republican 
ideals, took and divided Indian lands for distribution to white settlers. As historian Peter Onuf 
notes, “Jefferson’s philanthropy provided the moral and intellectual rationale for the removal of 
Indians across the Mississippi under President Andrew Jackson.”280 One race’s 
disenfranchisement allowed for the investiture of portions of another. Thus, Ohio Indians paid 
the cost for Jeffersonian republicanism, veterans’ grants, and the financial burden of the 
American Revolution many times over.281 
Buffalo as an Archetype of Environmental Transformation 
The Kentucky that John Filson described in 1784 was already dramatically different than 
only a few years before. The expatriation of Native American hunters and the partitioning, 
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fencing, and plowing of the lands dramatically changed the ecological composition of a region 
that was a Native American hunting preserve less than a decade before. White settlement 
dramatically transformed nearly every aspect of the natural world. Most dramatically, the 
American bison, so prolific in Kentucky prior to 1775, was eliminated by the beginning of the 
1800s. The loss of this species dramatically illustrates the other changes occurring in Kentucky’s 
ecology during the late eighteenth century. 
When James Harrod and Daniel Boone led colonists into Kentucky in 1774 and 1775, the 
buffalo still roamed the region. However, the arrival of permanent white settlement had an 
immediate impact on their numbers. Whites depended on wild game in the early years of 
settlement. The deprivations of war with the Indians and the British increased colonists’ needs. 
Men hired themselves out as hunters, while other men worked to improve the land. Whereas 
Indians and long hunters had carefully husbanded Kentucky’s herds, the region’s new 
permanent residents often hunted for sport. Richard Henderson, the colony’s proprietor, wrote:  
We found it very difficult at first and indeed yet, to stop the great waste in killing meat. 
Many men were ignorant of the woods, and not skilled in hunting… would shoot, cripple 
and scare the game without being able to get much… Others of wicked and wonton 
dispositions, would kill three, four, five of ½ dozen buffaloes, and not take half a horse 
load from them all.282 
 
At the first convention of the Transylvania Colony, Boone proposed a bill to prevent the “wanton 
destruction of game.”283 Such efforts had limited success, and sport killing became increasingly 
popular.  
English traveler Nicholas Cresswell, floating down the Ohio River to Kentucky, witnessed 
many acts of wasteful killing in the name of sport. Sometimes, he and his companions shot 
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buffalo as the animals swam across the river, and other times they fired indiscriminately at a 
herd near a salt lick. Another time, Creswell reported: 
We saw two Buffalo Bulls crossing the River. When they were about half way over four 
of us got into a Canoe and attacked them in the River, the rest went along the shore to 
shoot them, as soon as they came ashore. The River was wide and we had fine diversion 
fighting them in the water. The man in the head of the canoe seized one of them by the 
tail and he towed us about the river for half an hour. We shot him eight times, let him 
get ashore and he ran away. Our comrades ashore very angry with us and they have a 
great right to be so.284 
 
In fact, Cresswell’s companions seem to have spent most of their time killing for sport, leaving 
Cresswell fairly frustrated with all the wastefulness. He wrote as much in his journal, “Our stupid 
company will not stay to jerk any [meat], tho’ we are in want of provisions.”285 Privately 
Cresswell seems to have regretted his behavior, but participated in the killing on every occasion. 
For all the abundance of game, Cresswell and his companions nearly starved to death. 
 For many frontiersmen – and some women – killing animals was a rite of passage. James 
Harrod’s wife Ann seemed relieved when she killed a buffalo, saying, “I never could do much 
with a gun. I did manage to kill a cow [bison] and a bear, or the girls would have never got done 
laughing at me.”286 Killing a bison became, for many new arrivals to Kentucky, a symbol of 
rugged manliness. Some men developed rash and creative ways to kill the buffalo. Frontiersmen 
recorded several instances of men killing buffalo by hand. In 1779, for example, a soldier serving 
under Colonel John Bowman saw a buffalo and, “Desirous of performing some valiant exploit,” 
the man jumped onto the back of the animal and stabbed it to death.287 In another case, a 
settler named Tom Hood jumped out of a tree onto a passing buffalo and nearly died before he 
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could hamstring the animal.288 In both cases, the men sought enhanced reputations. One 
witness described Hood as “simple and daring” man who “sought this kind of notoriety.”289 But 
such pleasure killing was unsustainable.  
Filson’s described the buffalo to educate a population considering moving to the 
frontier but now several generations removed from seeing a bison: 
AMONG the native animals are the urus, or zorax, described by Cesar, which we call a 
buffalo, much resembling a large bull, of a great size, with a large head, thick short 
crooked horns, and broader in his forepart than behind. Upon his shoulder is a large 
lump of flesh, covered with a thick boss of long wool and curly hair, of a dark brown 
colour. They do not rise from the ground as our cattle, but spring up at once upon their 
feet; are of a broad make and clumsy appearance, with short legs, but run fast, and turn 
not aside for any thing when chased, except a standing tree. They weigh from five to ten 
hundred weight, are excellent meat, supplying the inhabitants in many parts with beef, 
and their hides make good leather.290 
 
Yet even Filson admitted that Kentucke’s wilderness was changing rapidly: 
 
I have heard a hunter assert, he saw above one thousand buffaloes at the Blue Licks at 
once; so numerous were they before the first settlers had wantonly sported away their 
lives. There still remains a great number in the exterior parts of the settlement. They 
feed upon cane and grass, as other cattle, and are innocent harmless creatures.291 
 
The dramatic increases in settlement across the trans-Appalachian West accelerated the 
bison’s demise. In the 1777, Kentucky had only two hundred eighty residents in Boonesborough 
and Harrodsburg, but a decade later, Kentucky had seventy three thousand residents and stood 
on the cusp of statehood.292 Newcomers imagined their own frontier hunting adventures. As a 
result, much wild game, already depleted to dangerously low levels, was quickly eliminated. 
Native Americans, who had once followed sustainable patterns of hunting, were replaced by a 
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largely white population that reveled in the extermination of Kentucky’s wild game. Settlers 
eliminated bison in the Bluegrass quickly, and the last remnants of the herds persisting only in 
the more sparsely populated regions in the western part of the state. In 1820, a small herd was 
seen just south of the Green River in Hart County, the last in Kentucky.293 
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CONCLUSION 
The Legacy of Competition After Statehood 
 The hundreds of thousands of settlers who responded to John Filson’s call to come to 
Kentucky arrived in a region wracked by a legacy of conflict. Violence, political blunders, legal 
wrangling, and environmental transformation produced something entirely different than the 
glowing descriptions found in Filson’s pamphlet. Even as the Indian wars ebbed and Kentucky 
achieved statehood, settlers grappled with how to overcome the mountain of litigation that 
Virginia’s land laws had produced. Squatter preemptions offered only limited solutions. 
Disputed claims continued to haunt Kentucky’s court system. But Thomas Jefferson’s vision of 
widespread land ownership and nearly universal white male suffrage continued to resonate with 
poor and landless citizens. A case heard by the Kentucky Court of Appeals illustrates the 
contentious legacy of the land laws of 1779. 
In 1794, Simon Kenton – famed companion of Daniel Boone – sued Alexander 
McConnell over a property boundary dispute. Kenton v. McConnell called into question all 
fundamental aspects of the land laws of 1779, the extent to which an improved area of land 
proved ownership of surrounding unimproved lands and the definition of “improvement.” In 
1779, including Virginia’s land commission found “Satisfactory proof that the said [Kenton] has a 
right to a settlement of 400 acres of land, including the said improvement and pre-emption of 
1000 acres adjoining, and that a certificate [be issued] accordingly.”294 A year later, Francis 
McConnell obtained a patent for an overlapping claim. The error was discovered when 
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McConnell’s son sold his deceased father’s property. After an extensive analysis of the 
appropriate interpretation of the land laws of 1779, Kentucky’s court of Appeals sided with 
McConnell, stating that although Kenton claimed residence in 1775, he had no proof of “raising 
corn” as the statute stipulated.295 The Court never disputed Kenton’s presence in Kentucky. Yet 
it overturned his claim on a series of rather ambiguous technicalities. Kenton was forced to 
surrender the overlapping portions of his claim and pay McConnell’s court fees.296 More 
important, the court “ruled that the Virginia Land Commission Court had exceeded its authority 
when it determined the rights to numerous land disputes in Kentucky in 1779-1780.”297  
The ruling proved deeply unpopular with those who had received patents under the 
land laws. Many believed that nefarious forces were at work to undo early claims, and that 
virtually any preemption awarded under the terms of the land laws had become suspect. The 
legislature reacted by attempting to remove the justices responsible for the ruling. This case, 
coupled with other unpopular rulings by the Court of Appeals, helped precipitate Kentucky’s 
second Constitutional Convention in 1799. Nine members of the state senate moved to block a 
convention. Some saw this action as a return to the aristocratic traditions of Virginia. An author 
writing under the pen name of Gracchus – surname of the brothers who championed populist 
land policies as tribunes in the Roman Senate – challenged the senators: “Those opposed to the 
convention say you are free from oppression, that your rights are secured under the present 
constitution; that any change is unnecessary and hazardous…. And what does this mean but that 
you are ignorant and besotted? Well may you blush to find a man among you so destitute of 
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genuine republicanism as to suggest such degrading ideas.”298 The claims of the anonymous 
Gracchus illustrate the currency of Jeffersonian republican ideals among Kentucky’s poor and 
landless, to resentment of the legacy of Virginia’s land laws continued into the nineteenth 
century. The struggle over Kentucky’s lands played out for decades, and influenced the 
formation of Kentucky’s state government. In spite of the popular unrest among many of 
Kentucky’s residents, the Constitution of 1799 continued to recognize laws and agreements 
made under Virginian rule.299  
Kentucky’s Legacy Outside the State 
Kentucky remained influential beyond its borders. Emigration and outmigration 
continued throughout the decades following statehood. The Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794) and 
the Treaty of Greenville (1795) opened much of the Old Northwest to white colonization. As the 
Ohio Country became more populous, local Indians struggled against increasingly bleak odds. 
However, they learned from the bitter lessons of Kentucky and drew closer together to resist 
further white encroachment in the 1790s and again in the 1810s.300 The losses of Kentucky and 
Ohio sowed the seeds of the pan-Indian alliances of the early 1800s, embodied by the Shawnee 
statesman Tecumseh.  
By the time it achieved statehood, Kentucky’s environment had been so transformed by 
hunting and deforestation that Indians could scarcely depend on it for game as they had only 
two decades earlier. By the early 1800s, large mammals like bear, elk, and wolves followed the 
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course of the bison.301 The only remaining evidence of Kentucky’s bison was the roads on which 
the settlers traveled to Kentucky, the buffalo traces worn several feet deep into Kentucky’s 
soils.302 White settlers (and their black slaves) turned forests, cane breaks, and prairies into 
farmland, as Kentucky was reshaped into the agricultural economy whites desired.  
Kentucky’s experience was felt outside the state as well. Virginia’s population continued 
to migrate west, fleeing depleted soils and an entrenched aristocracy.303 Statesmen and 
settlement in the Northwest Territory attempted to correct the mistakes made in Kentucky. The 
mass migrations further west during the early 1800s followed patterns similar to those in 
Kentucky. Yet the process of land distribution varied from place to place. Throughout this 
migration, Jefferson’s vision of a republican polity based on a landholding yeomanry remained 
the banner of western expansion, even as speculation continued to play an insidious role.304 
PERSPECTIVE 
 Fundamentally, this narrative argues that the struggle for Kentucky’s lands remained 
rooted in the perspectives and agency of the people who contested for it. That struggle 
profoundly impacted all participants. Indians, speculators, squatters, and politicians sought to 
use Kentucky lands differently, their varying perspectives rooted in what each group valued in 
the land.  Native Americans valued Kentucky for its natural productive capacity. Speculators saw 
Kentucky’s lands as an investment to exploit. Squatters and yeoman farmers wanted to 
transform Kentucky’s natural ecology into the manicured patchwork of farms and woodlots that 
sustained the bulk of early America’s population. Some politicians, like Jefferson, sought to use 
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Kentucky’s land to advance broad idealistic goals, while others hoped to use the land to solve 
important state and national problems. 
 While the conflict over Kentucky transformed Kentucky, it also transformed the peoples 
involved. Native Americans, governments, speculators, and settlers all experienced profound 
changes as a result of their struggle in the region and the land laws of 1779. The Euro-American 
colonization of Kentucky, wrought by the gun, the plow, and the pen, represented a watershed 
moment that transformed the West.   The conflict in Kentucky served as the harbinger of future 
conquest, colonization, and transformation that played out across the continent in America’s 
rapid westward expansion. 
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